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Abstract
Energy markets are complex networks of producers, exporters, traders and con-
sumers characterized by different market structures in each sector. The infrastruc-
tural network connecting the markets plays an important role in determining the
volume of the trade flows and the location of the final consumption.
The market players’ behavior in an energy market can be described using a game
theoretic approach where each player’s decision depends on the other market play-
ers decisions. Over the last decades these ideas have evolved and there have been
produced some material where markets for a single commodity are modeled, using
ideas from game theory to describe the players’ influence on each other’s decisions.
However, little work has been done analyzing multi-commodity markets with the
same set of tools. Based on existing literature that is written on single-commodity
modeling, we have applied equilibrium programming with complementarity struc-
ture to describe the markets for electricity and natural gas in Northern Europe
through a strategic market model. The complexity level is potentially high, so we
decided to limit ourselves to a deterministic and myopic model without investment
possibilities.
The problem is formulated through a strategic MCP model where each market
participant solves an optimization problem connected through the market clearing
conditions. Besides showing that the model is an MCP we implemented the model
in GAMS and solved it for the gas and electricity market in Northern Europe.
Our results indicates that a Cournot model gives an adequate description of the
electricity and gas market in Northern Europe, and that considerable changes in
production, consumption, traded volumes and prices in one market can lead to
price, quantity and welfare effects in markets far away from the initial cause. We
can also register close links between the markets for electricity and natural gas,
suggesting that agents’ behavior in one commodity market might affect the other
commodity market and vice versa.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
This chapter presents a brief introduction to the many challenges of modeling
energy markets. Section 1.1 provides the background and motivation for the thesis
while Section 1.2 introduces some of the modeling frameworks being used in market
modeling. Section 1.2 is meant as a starting point for further analysis and does
not go into the details in each of the modeling approaches. An overview of the
thesis and its structural outline is given in Section 1.3.
1.1 Background
Choices made by market participants in an energy market can be described using
fundamental game theory. Using a game theoretic approach, this thesis seeks to
identify presence of market power in the gas and electricity markets of Northern
Europe and analyze how strategic behavior will influence the market prices and
volumes.
The European markets for gas and electricity have undergone some major changes
over the last decades. In the 1990s and early 2000 they both went through a liber-
alization process that broke the monopolistic structures that had characterized the
supply side of the industries. Despite initiatives from supranational organizations,
the development towards two fully liberalized markets has been restrained. Lack
of sufficient interconnections and transfer capacities are pointed out as some of the
issues that needs to be solved to achieve the goal of the European Union.
The reasons of modeling the markets for gas and electricity instead of other energy
carriers like oil, coal, renewables or nuclear energy are many. First of all, both
markets share a lot of important characteristics. They are both partly liberalized
1
CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION
markets that allows for an oligopolistic representation. In addition, they both
have a reliable supply and a well-developed network for regional and international
distribution. There has also been made a lot of research in modeling electricity and
gas markets separately through single-commodity models. However, little work has
been done in integrating both markets into the same model. Hence, we want to
analyze both the gas and electricity market within a single modeling framework.
1.2 Modeling Approaches
While energy markets are complex, energy models are simplified representations
of energy production and consumption, regulations, and producer and consumer
behavior. There are different ways of modeling energy markets; each with its
advantages and disadvantages. You can look at several trading regimes, various
pricing strategies, different set of market actors’ behavior, multiple commodities,
simple or complicated nodal structure and the list goes on. The more you include,
the more complexity you add to your model. The following paragraphs summarize
and concretize three applicable frameworks being used in modeling energy markets:
optimization, equilibrium modeling and network analysis.
1.2.1 Optimization
The first optimization techniques go back to the 19th century and the mathemati-
cians’ search for the steepest descent of a function. In the middle of the 20th
century efficient algorithms of solving optimization problems developed and opti-
mization was found a valuable tool for industry processes. Today, optimization is
applicable to a large set of problems and plays an important role of planning and
forecasting in nearly all types of industries.
Despite the multiple range of use, the general structure is the same: you want to
maximize or minimize an objective function (1.2.1) of its argument(s) under a set
of constraints (1.2.2). The complexity of the function and the constraints can vary
from few variables and a linear structure, to numerous variables and nonlinear
problems.
2
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In any case, the basic setup can be expressed in the following form:
max
x
f(x) (1.2.1)
s.t. gi(x) ≤ 0, ∀i ∈ I (1.2.2)
where x denotes the decision variable, f(x) the objective function and gi(x) the
i’th constraint.
There exists a lot of market models using an optimization approach for expressing
energy markets. However, traditional optimization models fails whenmarket power
is included in the model (Harker et al. [1993]).
1.2.2 Equilibrium Modeling
Duality theory from optimization models forms the basis of the complementarity
concepts that are used in equilibrium modeling. Complementarity structures have
the favorable properties of handling equilibria situations, both generally and in
particular game settings. This characteristic is especially useful dealing with eco-
nomic models and game theoretic problems where states of equilibria is likely to
occur.
The method is simple enough; by solving each and every individual’s optimization
problem within the complementarity system simultaneously, the resulting solution
will be the equilibrium solution of the market game. Hence, the equilibrium so-
lution goes beyond the solution of the individual optimization problem of each
player, by giving the simultaneous solution to all agents in the game. In many sit-
uations the individualistic interests of each player cause the equilibrium solution
not to be pareto optimal1. A way of dealing with this is by introducing rewards
and penalties that change the players’ incentives.
1A famous example of the inefficiency of equilibrium solutions includes the Prisoner’s
Dilemma. Here, we have two criminals, Bonnie and Clyde, who have been caught by the police.
The police has only enough information to charge them for a minor fraud, but suspect that they
are responsible for a major fraud, which will give them a harder punishment. The criminals
are being separated and each of them is presented with two choices: Either testify against your
partner or to remain silent. If both testify, they will get five years in jail each. On the other
hand, if both choose to remain silent, they get one year in jail each. The last scenario follows if
Bonnie testifies against Clyde, while at the same time Clyde remains silent. That would lead to
Bonnie being set free (zero years in jail) and Clyde would get ten years in jail, and vice versa.
The equilibrium solution will in this particular case be that both players testify resulting in five
years in jail each. However, both players would be better off if they both had remained silent,
giving both players only one year in jail. Accordingly, the equilibrium solution is not the pareto
optimum.
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Midthun [2007b] describes the general form the complementarity format of finding
a vector x, assuming f(x) ≥ 0, satisfying the complementarity condition f(x)Tx =
0.
For each element i of the vector x, either xi or fi(x) must equal zero:
0 ≤ xi ⊥ fi(x) ≥ 0, ∀i ∈ I (1.2.3)
Accordingly, the variables x and f(x) are called complementary.
A general maximization problem becomes:
max
x
f(x) (1.2.4)
s.t. gi(x) ≤ 0, (λi), ∀i ∈ I (1.2.5)
hj(x) = 0, (µj), ∀j ∈ J (1.2.6)
x ≥ 0 (1.2.7)
where i and j are indexing the inequalities and equalities respectively.
The corresponding Karush-Kuhn-Tucker conditions (KKT) to the maximization
problem are necessary and sufficient for optimality given that f(x) is concave and
the feasible solution space is convex.
∇f(x) +
∑
i
λi∇gi(x)T +
∑
j
µj∇hj(x)T = 0 (1.2.8)
0 ≥ gi(x) ⊥ λi ≥ 0, ∀i ∈ I (1.2.9)
hj(x) = 0, µj free, ∀j ∈ J (1.2.10)
where (1.2.8) makes sure the solution is stationary while (1.2.9) and (1.2.10) guar-
antees complementarity and feasibility. Note that the dual variable λi of the
inequality (1.2.5) has to be greater or equal to zero, while the dual µj of equality
(1.2.6) can take any real number.
The structure of the objective function and the constraints defines the character
of the equilibrium problem. Figure 1.2.1 lists the most important subgroups and
their relations. A rigorous discussion of each of them is given in Section 5.6.
Imperfect games where one or more players exert market power, are often described
by complementarity conditions and equilibrium states. In this way each players’
decisions are taken into account, formally expressed through the KKT conditions.
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Figure 1.2.1: Important subgroups of equilibrium problems.
In general, solving the resulting system of equations and proving uniqueness and
existence of the solution happens to be mathematically challenging. Because of
these difficulties, many of the economical papers written on equilibrium modeling
do not leave this subject a thought at all, and solely base the validity of their result
on earlier papers written by mathematicians.
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1.2.3 Network Analysis
A third commonly used approach of analyzing energy markets is by using graph
theory fundamentals. By thinking of each interconnection between nodes as arcs
you can create economical interpretations of network theorems and solve cost min-
imizing problems in an efficient way (Figure 1.2.2). Historically this method has
been primarily applied in routing problems, but has also proved useful in modeling
commodity markets.
!"
#"
$"
%"
&"
'"
("
)"
Figure 1.2.2: Non-directed graph with arcs and vertices.
1.3 Thesis Overview
This thesis introduces a two-commodity complementarity model analyzing the
prices and volumes for natural gas and electricity in Northern Europe. Further-
more, we sought to investigate presence of market power, how the two commodities
influence each other and how the market players act from a game theoretic per-
spective.
In order to understand the supply and demand side of the two markets, the value
chains of natural gas and electricity were given a thorough study. This was crucial
to get a realistic picture of the parameters that affects the commodity trade and
an understanding of the interaction between the two value chains. We have also
looked into the market situation for both commodities and identified different
market structures that are present.
6
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Moreover, a brief mapping of important game theoretic aspects has been carried
out to understand the underlying concepts of strategic actions between market
actors. Different model classes are listed with the accompanying properties, range
of applications and solution approaches.
To get the fundamental modeling pieces in place we created a simplified model
that describes many of the challenges of equilibrium programming. First of all,
this basic model works as a starting point for the extended model, but it also give
some interesting results concerning market power.
Furthermore, an MCP equilibrium model of the market for both natural gas and
electricity were created based on the theoretical part of the thesis, the simplified
model and existing research done in modeling each of the sectors. We found it
necessary to make a large set of assumptions to get the complex system into a
reasonable model, but we are still confident that the realism is safeguarded and
the results are of importance.
The thesis opens with the analysis of the two value chains including a study of
the respective market situations in Chapter 3 and Chapter 4. This is followed
by some game theoretic interpretations in Chapter 5. Chapter 6 presents the
simplified model followed by the MCP equilibrium model and the accompanying
implementation in Chapter 7 and 8. Chapter 9 includes deliberations of the data
sets, while the main results and the following discussion is written in Chapter
10 and Chapter 11 respectively. The conclusion is stated in Chapter 12 while
appendices are given in Appendix A to C and represent the very end of the paper.
7
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Chapter 2
Literature Review
The following chapter gives an overview of literature made on modeling energy
markets with focus on game theoretic approaches in particular. Section 2.1 presents
literature treating the mathematics behind equilibrium programming and theoretic
fundamentals written on the subject. Applications of this theory on modeling
commodity markets are described in Section 2.2, while Section 2.3 puts in concrete
terms how this thesis extends the existing area of research.
2.1 Equilibrium Programming
Two of the most groundbreaking papers on equilibrium programming were those
of Debreu [1952] and Arrow and Debreu [1954]. They proved existence of equi-
libria in competitive economies and presented one of the first theoretical papers
describing equilibrium programming and its economic applications. Szidarovszky
and Yakowitz [1977] and Novshek [1985] added some important contributions to
the theory, modifying the conditions for existence and uniqueness of Cournot-Nash
equilibria.
The complexity of the problem is often related to the problem class, which again
is highly dependent on the structure of the problem. Harker [1991], Billups and
Murty [2000], Dempe [2003], Midthun [2007a] and Cottle et al. [2009] give an
overview over the problem classes within the complementarity format presenting
characteristics and solution approaches for each of them. Harker et al. [1993]
presents a nice summary over historical developments, relevant theory of equilib-
rium programming and its wide range of applications.
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2.2 Modeling Commodity Markets
Despite the liberalization process in the European gas and electricity markets we
can observe strategic behavior at different levels of the value chain. Berry et al.
[1999] and Mathiesen et al. [1986] describe the market situations and explain why
strategic behavior is likely to occur in gas and electricity markets, and why some
players in the market game both can and will use market power.
The well-defined methods of deriving economical equilibria for monopolies and
perfect competition situations fall short when it comes to cases with few firms
operating in a single market. However, Murphy et al. [1982] demonstrated how
oligopolistic equilibria can be determined through a mathematical approach and
thereby describe oligopolistic market situations.
The oligopolistic theory is often represented by three market models: Cournot,
Bertrand and Stackelberg. In the Cournot model, firms make simultaneous deci-
sions about how much of a homogeneous good to produce. In the Bertrand model,
firms make simultaneous decisions about what price to set for the homogeneous
good. While in the Stackelberg model, one firm moves first, deciding how much
to produce, and the other firm responds.
There have been written many papers on different non-cooperative games within
various commodity markets. Hobbs [1986] compares the Bertrand and Cournot
models and argue for their modeling relevance. The GASMOD model of Holz
et al. [2008] uses the complementarity conditions to solve market equilibria. It
states that Cournot competition on both the upstream and downstream market is
the most realistic representation of today’s European gas market, where suppliers
generate a mark-up at the expense of the final customer. The World Gas Model
of Egging et al. [2010] formulates the gas market as an equilibrium model allowing
producers and traders to act non-cooperatively as of Cournot.
Jing-Yuan and Smeers [1999] demonstrates how mathematical programming ap-
proaches can be used to determine Cournot-Nash market equilibria in electricity
markets. In the same way, Hobbs [2002] and Hobbs et al. [2002] argue for Cournot
competition in electricity markets. Lise et al. [2006] develops a static compu-
tational game theoretic model where different market structures are compared,
depending on the ability of firms to exercise market power.
Haftendorn and Holz [2008] analyzes the world market for steam coal through a
complementarity model. Unlike the market for gas and electricity, it indicates
that the Cournot model is not realistic. However, the reality implicates some form
of market power in this market, possibly following a Bertrand model in a spatial
setting.
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Hobbs and Kelly [1992] analyzed the transmission pricing policies in the U.S. as a
non-cooperative game using the two-stage Stackelberg model. In general, dynamic
Stackelberg games are difficult to solve, and the modeling complexity is also higher
than one-stage models.
2.3 Model Aspects
The numerical model described in this thesis differs from the majority of existing
literature on the field. Instead of using a single-commodity approach we introduce
a strategic multi-commodity model including both natural gas and electricity. To
our knowledge, few or none strategic market models include this multi-commodity
aspect.
Abrell andWeigt [2010] analyzes the interaction between the electricity and natural
gas network applying a partial equilibrium approach resulting in an MCP model.
This model could very well be solved as an optimization model, because of the
absence of market power. As opposed to the MCP model of Abrell and Weigt
[2010] we include the possibility of strategic behavior in the market game.
In several ways, the game theoretic model approach used in this thesis differs
from traditional energy market modeling formulated as pure optimization prob-
lems. Firstly, the modeling process gets more complicated as some of the agents
possess market power and will use this to gain profits. Secondly, the search for
optimal solutions gets more difficult as we are seeking an equilibrium solution,
a state where none of the agents have incentives of changing its strategy, rather
than a global optimum. Thirdly, proving existence and uniqueness of solutions
of complementarity problems can be mathematically challenging without making
certain assumptions.
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Chapter 3
Electricity
This chapter describes electricity, its characteristics, trade and market features.
The value chain of electricity is investigated in Section 3.1. This is necessary to
understand the dynamics of the electricity market and how a market participant
in one of the stages will influence the other players in the value chain. Moreover,
Section 3.2 surveys the current market and points out different market essentials
present in Europe. Section 3.3 presents power exchanges, their function and pres-
ence of necessity in a liberalized market.
3.1 Electricity Value Chain
!"#$%&' (&)&$*+")' ,$*)-./--/")' 0/-1$/2#+")' 3&1*/4/)5'
Figure 3.1.1: Electricity value chain.
Source: We live in a world where electricity is fully integrated, and people take
easy power access for granted. However, electricity is not an energy resource in
the same way as fuel, wood and water. You cannot drill for electricity in the Gulf
of Mexico; neither can you dig for electricity in Russian mines, you cannot even
send electricity through a windmill and expect it to rotate.
Electricity is based on a source of energy, including both non-renewable resources
(coal, oil, gas, uranium) and renewable resources (wind, water, solar, geo). Fuels
are usually transported through pipes, rails or by large vehicles to conversion
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facilities. Even so, for most of the renewables the power conversion takes place in
generators at the exact location of the source.
Generation: At the conversion facility the source is transferred from its original
form into electric power. Depending on the power source there are different meth-
ods in use to obtain high efficiency on the net power output. For fuels the most
prevalent method is by using electromechanical generators driven by heat engines.
The various generators deliver power into the same local grid where electricity
from all producers merges.
Transmission: Transmission cover the transfer of electricity from power plants to
smaller substations located near the end-user. These grids are usually transmitting
high voltage currents to avoid energy losses in long-distance transfers.
Distribution: Distributors carry the electricity from the substations to the cus-
tomers. These networks are usually carrying medium-voltage currents transform-
ing them down to low-voltage current depending on the customer.
Retailing and Consuming: Electricity retailers charge the customers for the
amount of electricity being used and therefore connect the customers to the rest
of the value chain. However, if a consumer changes its retailer, this will only affect
the price and terms of the deliveries - the physical power flow will remain the same.
3.2 Electricity Market
The electricity market is limited by the main feature of electricity, it can not be
stored. Due to this property, it is necessary to transmit and retail the electricity
immediately after production.
3.2.1 Market Principles
The physical features of electricity place limitations on the trading and make it
necessary to induce some standards of trade. Today there are two main standards
in use, the Single-Buyer (SB) and Third Party Access (TPA).
The SB model illustrated in Figure 3.2.1 is characterized by one, single buyer
buying electricity at the lowest cost from producers and sells it to end-users. This
model gives preferential treatment to the sole buyer and is therefore not often in
use in Western Europe.
14
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Generators Transmission Distributors Consumers 
Figure 3.2.1: The single-buyer model for electricity trading.
A more common way of trade is through the TPA model that allows for third party
access to the transmission grid (Figure 3.2.2). There are two ways of interpreting
this practice. Regulated Third Party Access (rTPA) assumes that the grid access
is based on regulated prices (assuming a regulatory authority), while Negotiated
Third Party Access (nTPA) assumes negotiated prices.
3.2.2 From Closed to Liberalized Electricity Market
While trade with non-renewable resources has been executed for many years, elec-
tricity trading is a relatively new business. The fact that electricity is a non-
storable energy carrier makes trade more challenging as demand and supply vary
continuously over time. Today electricity is usually traded as a commodity on
power exchanges, i.e. it is traded on the basis of price rather than quality.
Historically the power business has been dominated by vertically integrated com-
panies controlling the following parts of the value chain; generation, transmission
and distribution. Through large, centralized generating facilities, integrated with
transmission and distribution systems, they acted as natural monopolists in the
15
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Transmission Distributors Consumers Generators 
Figure 3.2.2: The TPA model for electricity trading.
market. This was based on the assumption that economies of scale would be the
most efficient way of generating power. Simultaneously, governmental regulations
controlled prices and operating procedures to protect customers from monopolistic
abuses.
In the early 1980s several South American countries pioneered the electricity busi-
ness by privatizing generation assets that government had failed to operate. This
lead to a deregulation of the traditional governmental monopoly and opening up
the supply of electricity to competition. At the same time, there were some major
technical developments in the power industry. Cheap and highly efficient gas-fired
power plants replaced many of the old coal-fired plants and new long-distance
transmission technology gave customers more flexibility in choice of supplier. All
this shifted the traditional system to a more competitive marketplace.
In 1990, Margaret Thatcher1 adapted these concepts and slowly, but surely the
whole Commonwealth experienced deregulated electricity markets. Even though
the countries executed the concept differently, the basic ideas were the same: Sep-
1Margaret Hilda Thatcher was Prime Minister of the United Kingdom from 1979 to 1990 and
Leader of the Conservatives from 1975 to 1990.
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aration of the monopoly into a wholesale electricity market and a retail electricity
market.
3.2.3 Wholesale Electricity Market
The wholesale market is based on trade between generators, grid owners and re-
tailers, both for short-term purposes (spot prices) and for long-term deliveries
(forward prices). Wholesale trading takes place both bilaterally, on the over-the-
counter market (OTC), and through power exchanges. Over the last decade there
have been some large end-users trying to reduce their overhead costs, buying di-
rectly (wholesale) from the generators. This will usually involve high investment
costs and higher uncertainty, but for large-scale end-users it might turn out prof-
itable.
3.2.4 Retail Electricity Market
After a trade in the wholesale market, the retailer re-prices the electricity and sells
it to final consumers through the retail market. The customers can freely choose
their supplier from competing retailers offering electricity to different prices and
pricing regimes. Most common is the fixed-price regime where the supplier is
constrained to a given price during the contract period, even though it might
be high prices in the supply market. There are also contracts based on variable
pricing, where the retailer can change the price after sending a warning to the
customers. In addition, there exist some spot contracts that are connected to the
wholesale spot prices.
3.3 Power Exchanges
As a response to the liberalization of the European electricity sector, numerous
power exchanges has been put into operation (Table 3.3.1). The rationale behind
them is to facilitate trading of short-term standardized products and promotion
of market competition, information and liquidity. Theoretically power exchanges
will also serve as a ”neutral and easy access marketplace with negligible transaction
costs, a neutral price reference, a safe counterpart, and a clearing and settlement
provider” (Madlener and Kaufmann [2002]). In addition, the spot prices are im-
portant references for bilateral contracts for forward, future and options contracts.
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Name Country/Region
APX Netherlands
Belpex Belgium
Borzen Slovenia
EEX Germany
Elexon Great Britain
EXAA Austria
GME Italy
HUPX Hungary
Nord Pool Spot Scandinavia
OMEL Spain
OMIP Portugal
OPCOM Romania
OTE Czech Republic
Powernext France
SEMO Ireland
TGE Poland
UKPX / APX UK / UK IPE United Kingdom
Table 3.3.1: European power exchanges.
3.3.1 Auctions
Most European power exchanges are organized by auctions2. There are various
ways of promoting auctions (Table 3.3.2), but the basic idea is the same: the
marketer receives bids from generators and demand bids from retailers or large
end-users. The marketer then calculates the optimal strategy that minimizes cost
but still meets the demand and the physical grid constraints.
In Europe, the most prevalent way of clearing contracts is through hourly double
sided auctions where transactions are cleared at a given price at a fixed time. Both
buyers and sellers submit their bids, which determine how much they are willing
to sell and buy and to what prices. Depending on the power exchange there might
be upper price limits and also mechanisms that limits price volatility and ensure
continuity in price. In a sealed bid auction, your bid is only visible to the marketer
and yourself. It is possible to submit the same bids over consecutive time periods,
in so-called block bids.
2APX UK, UKPX, Borzen and EEX practice a continuous bidding system where all bidders
have access to the order book.
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Criteria Type Type
Number of bidding sides One-sided Two-sided
Objective function Cost minimizing Consumer payment minimizing
Pricing rule Uniform pricing Discriminatory pricing
Disclosure of bids Open Sealed
Table 3.3.2: Different types of auctions used in power trade (Madlener and Kauf-
mann [2002]).
Based on the bids from both producers and consumers, the marketer aggregates
the bids to get a market demand and supply curve. If the initial auction price
violates one or more of the conditions, one of the unfulfilled bids is removed, and
the same calculation is repeated. This iteration will continue until there are only
valid bids left in the auction.
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Chapter 4
Natural Gas
The following chapter presents natural gas, its value chain and market character-
istics. The value chain is analyzed in Section 4.1 while a historical overview of
important developments in the European gas market is presented in Section 4.2.
Section 4.3 describes the gas hubs and their role in a modern gas market.
4.1 Natural Gas Value Chain
Natural gas is considered one of the most important energy sources of tomorrow.
With its abundant supply and environmental advantages natural gas is predicted
to play an important role supplying Europe and the rest of the world with cleaner
energy.
Natural gas is originally organic material transformed into gas through million
years of high pressure and temperature. The gas can be found in oil fields as
associated gas, in gas fields as non-associated gas and in coal beds as coal bed
methane. Usually the rich gas contains components that are removed before the
dry gas is available for end-users. The value chain of natural gas is represented in
Figure 3.3.2.
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Figure 4.1.1: Natural gas value chain.
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Exploration and Production: The exploration part cover the process where
natural gas is discovered and production facilities are planned. Seismological anal-
ysis radars the seabed and provide reason for field development. The production
facilities can be put onshore, offshore and also on the seabed as subsea installa-
tions. Extracting the gas from the fields takes place on the production sights,
where the gas enters from high-pressured reservoirs. There are primarily three
different wells natural gas can be extracted from: crude oil-, gas- and condensate
wells.
Processing: The rich gas enters the processing plants containing significant
amounts of alkanes, CO2, nitrogen, helium and hydrogen sulphides. In order to
separate the methane (dry gas) from the other substances the rich gas is heated.
This process removes contaminants and heavier hydrocarbons to meet the industry
standards for transportation in high-pressure pipelines.
Transport and storage: Natural gas can be transported in high-pressure pipelines
from the processing units to local distribution companies, or with LNG-carriers
from liquefaction plants to import terminals. LNG1 is usually preferred when large
volumes are transported over long distances. The fact that the short-term demand
for natural gas is subject to large fluctuations, there would be beneficial to store
natural gas in low-demand periods and use the reserves in high-demand periods.
There are several commercial storage methods in use today: injecting gas into
abandoned oil and gas fields, liquefaction plants with storage facilities, and using
the comprehensive pipeline network as storage.
Market: The gas enters import terminals from pipelines and the LNG-network.
From here the gas is brought to the market and traded to the customers through
local networks and priced according to different pricing regimes. A thorough review
of the market for natural gas is presented in Section 4.2.
End-user: Most of the natural gas production in Europe is transformed to elec-
tricity in power plants. This fraction is expected to increase in the future, as the
demand for green power gets even higher than today’s level. However, natural
gas is used for a variety of purposes in different market sectors. Power intensive
industry use gas for heating, while other use it as a raw material in their industry
processes. Commercial use of gas includes heating, lightning and cooling of public
and private enterprises, like schools, hotels, restaurants and office buildings. The
residential use of gas is mainly due to cooking, heating and cooling. With its low
emissions and high efficiency there is also a potential for natural gas as fuel for
vehicles in the transport sector.
1LNG (Liquefied Natural Gas) is natural gas in liquid phase at a temperature of -163◦C. The
volume is reduced 600 times, enabling efficient transport and storage.
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4.2 Historical Perspectives of the European Gas
Market
The first gas production in Europe started already early in the 19th century. This
gas was exploited from coal and used as city lightning and later on in private
households in the major cities. As a result, Northern Europe had a well-developed
distribution network for coal gas in the beginning of the 20th century. In the 1930s
Italy and France discovered their first natural gas reserves and some decades later,
Netherlands, Germany and United Kingdom also started production of natural
gas. However, the demand for natural gas did not accelerate until the 1960s, when
the national demand exceeded the internal supply. This entailed the establishment
of a comprehensive distribution network for natural gas, which in turn initiated an
international natural gas market (Figure 4.2.1). Later on, Russia expanded their
gas fields in Siberia and became an important gas distributor to the European gas
market.
Figure 4.2.1: Development of the European gas network from 1970 (left) to 2000
(right) (Forum [2004]).
The first contracts were typically long-term contracts, to ensure payback on the
capital-intensive pipeline investments. In that way, the risk linked to pipeline
investments were minimal and made this type of contracts favorable. As the world
faced high oil prices during the international oil crises in the 1980s, the incentives
for natural gas exploration and distribution became even better. When the oil
price again stabilized large volumes of natural gas were available and the gas price
fell.
During the 1990s there was raised a growing concern regarding the competitiveness
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of European industry in a globalized market. As a response EU introduced Gas
Directive I2 (1998) and Gas Directive II3 (2003). These directives were supposed
to liberalize the market and create one single market for European gas.
4.3 The European Gas Hubs
Today’s situation is a combination of monopolized markets and new competitive
markets. At retail level, there are still countries where the consumers face price
capping, restrictions and regulations from governmental institutions. However, at
supply level, there remain no significant areas within the EU, where gas prices are
subject to direct national intervention to cap prices (Melling [2010]). In order to
achieve the vision of one single gas market, the local markets need to be integrated
properly – creating interconnections between the markets and expanding storing
facilities.
As mentioned, local markets organized as hubs characterize the European natural
gas market. At these hubs, buyers and sellers meet and agree on price and volume
on the contracts. The gas price can vary from hub to hub, and generally the
pricing falls into three categories depending on the degree of regulation, the market
liquidity and the competitiveness of the market:
1. Government-regulated prices (usually based on cost of service)
2. Price indexation to other fuels (usually oil-indexed pricing)
3. Spot market pricing in competitive gas markets
The increasing number of European hubs reflects the importance of natural gas.
Currently, there are nine major hubs (Figure 4.3.1), with the National Balancing
Point (NBP) in UK as the most mature and liquid and therefore closest related
to the ideal hub. Through Interconnector and Balgzand Bacton Line, this hub
was connected to the hubs in Zeebrugge (Belgium) and the Title Transfer Facility
(Netherlands), two of the most important hubs on the continent. Other hubs are
2The first Gas Directive (98/30/EC) sought to create competitive markets by ensuring access
to the network to third parties. This should be achieved by unbundling the transport and the
marketing sections of the traditional, vertically integrated monopolists, monitored by indepen-
dent regulatory authorities in each member state (Holz [2009]).
3The second Gas Directive, the so-called “Acceleration Directive“ (2003/55/EC). It mandated
regulatory third party access (TPA) for all existing infrastructures, including high-pressure tran-
sit pipelines for imports. The Acceleration Directive also commanded legal unbundling as the
minimum level of unbundling and it reinforced the importance of the regulator (Holz [2009]).
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emerging, but they are struggling by lack of supply liquidity and infrastructural
obstacles as border crossing and capacity constraints.
Figure 4.3.1: European gas hubs (Stern [2007]).
In the real world, ideal gas hubs will not occur. In theory, however, there exist
ideal hubs with several important characteristics:
1. Easy access to natural gas and a large customer portfolio
2. Connections to other hubs through pipelines and/or LNG-routes
3. Tools to handle fluctuations in supply and demand
4. Low or no entry costs for new actors
5. Standardized contracts and financial intermediaries to avoid negotiating di-
rectly with producers and consumers
6. Offer financial instruments to minimize risk related to price fluctuations
7. Be liquid and create trust between the actors on both sides of the contract
According to Tomasgard et al. [2007] and Midthun [2007a] pricing according to oil
indexation is the dominant method for long-term contracts4 in continental Europe.
4Most of the gas produced in Europe has been committed to take-or-pay (TOP) contracts
where the buyer agrees on taking a given volume of gas to import terminals for a fixed number
of years.
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Even though spot markets are developing in the Northwestern part of Europe, most
of the continent is not yet ready for the development of traded markets (Melling
[2010]).
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Game Theory
In this chapter, descriptions of relevant game theory and its wide range of appli-
ances are provided. It presents theory needed to understand the complexity of
equilibrium programming and serves as a fundament for discussions and decisions
made in later chapters. Section 5.1 introduces the topic and presents the basic
setup of a game. The equilibrium concept is explained in Section 5.2 focusing
on the mathematical representation of an equilibrium. This is followed by the
Cournot game in Section 5.3 while Section 5.4 extends the Cournot game through
the Generalized Nash Equilibrium. Section 5.5 concerns the KKT conditions and
their usability in market modeling whereas relevant model classes in Section 5.6
close the chapter.
5.1 Fundamental Concepts
Game theory has recently become a serious challenger to conventional economic
theory. Although aspects of game theory have been examined for centuries, the
first formal conception of the field were stated and structured in the famous work
Theory of Games and Economic Behavior of John von Neumann and Oskar Mor-
genstern (Von Neumann and Morgenstern [1944]). Subsequent theorists such as
John Nash and John Maynard Smith, has advanced the discipline and made game
theory applicable to politics, inter-personal relationships, biology, philosophy, ar-
tificial intelligence and other fields. Game theory is especially useful describing
situations and possible behavior where agents make strategic decisions to other
agents’ actions. An agent is faced with a set of moves that can be played and will
form and play a strategy based on a best response to other agents strategies.
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A game can be defined by a set of players N = { 1, ..., n} . Each player i ∈ I has
a number of actions, Xi, called player i’s pure strategies. Naming the collection of
all possible pure strategies :
X = X1 ×X2 × ...×Xn = { (x1, x2, ..., xn)|xi ∈ Xi}, ∀i ∈ I (5.1.1)
This is simply the set of all possible strategy configurations in the game.
Moreover, each player’s payoff function, denoted by ui(x) is defined. This payoff
function takes into consideration not only player i’s chosen strategy, but also the
other actions made by the other players in the game.
Thus, the input in the payoff function takes a pure strategy :
x = x1, x2, ..., xn ∈ X (5.1.2)
and returns a number ui(x) ∈ R. This gives ui(x) : X → R, where ui(x) is a
function from the set of all pure strategies to the set of all real numbers, R.
Another important aspect in game theory is the rationality assumptions, ensuring
that each player would not intentionally make decisions that would leave them
worse off:
1. Every player is rational in his or her choices (utility maximizing)
2. Every player knows that the other players are rational
3. Every player knows assumption 2
4. Every player knows assumption 3
5. ...
5.2 Concept of Equilibrium
Once a game is established there is a need for a method of predicting the actions
of the different players. A way of assigning predicted strategies to games is named
an equilibrium concept.
First, one might look for any dominant strategies among the players. A strategy
xi is dominant compared to other strategies, if it gives a higher payoff regardless
of the actions the other players choose. We can express this formally: xi ∈ Xi
is dominant if ui(xi, x−i) ≥ ui(x′i, x−i) for all x′i ∈ Xi and x−i ∈ X−i, where x−i
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denotes the set of all vectors of pure strategies with the i ’th element removed
(all players except player i). If ui(xi, x−i) > ui(x′i, x−i) there exists a strictly
dominating strategy. If ui(xi, x−i) ≥ ui(x′i, x−i) and for at least one xi ∈ Xi gives
ui(xi, x−i) > ui(x′i, x−i), a weakly dominating strategy exists (Lamberson [2009]).
In other words, when a dominant strategy is discovered, this strategy will always
be preferred regardless of the opponents actions – it is simply the best response in
every situation.
In many games it will not necessarily exist dominant strategies, and therefore one
cannot always use the above-mentioned technique. A weaker equilibrium concept
is that of a Pure Strategy Nash Equilibrium (PSNE). A pure strategy xi is a best
response to x−i ∈ X−i if ui(xi, x−i) ≥ ui(x′i, x−i) for all x′i. A profile of strategies
x ∈ X is a PSNE if xi is a best response to x−i for all i. Informally, given a
strategy tuple x ∈ X where none of the players has anything to gain in changing
their strategy, there exists a PSNE.
PSNE is one type of Nash equilibriums; another one is Mixed Strategy Nash Equi-
librium (MSNE). In mixed strategies you do not necessarily have to play one of the
pure strategies with probability equal to 1. Instead you can play each of the pure
strategies xj with a probability µi(xi) where
∑n
j=1 µj(xj) = 1. (5.2.1) states that
the sum of player i’s payoff from every strategy x multiplied by the probability of
each player choosing x:
∑
x∈X
( n∏
j=1
µj(xj)
)
ui(x), ∀i ∈ I (5.2.1)
An MSNE exists if each player is maximizing their expected payoff conditional on
all the other players playing the mixed strategy specified by µ. Said in mathemat-
ical terms:
∑
x∈X
( n∏
j=1
µj(xj)
)
ui(x) ≥
∑
x−i∈X−i
(∏
j 6=1
µj(xj)
)
ui(x
′
i, x−i), ∀i ∈ I (5.2.2)
5.3 Cournot Competition
For now, only games with finite strategy spaces, but with the possibility of playing
mixed strategies have been discussed. According to Cournot [1838] the Cournot
model possesses a continuous strategy space. This model describes the competition
between N firms in the same market and has the following features:
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1. There is more than one firm and they all produce a homogenous product
2. Firms do not cooperate
3. Firms have market power, i.e. each firms output decision affects the good’s
price
4. The number of firms, N, is fixed
5. Firms compete in quantities and choose quantities simultaneously
6. The firms are economically rational, and seeks to maximize profit given their
competitors decisions
Cournot solved this problem by assuming that each firm chooses its profit maxi-
mizing output by treating rival output as given and choosing the best response to
the rival’s actions.
The general structure is as follows: There are N firms, that individually and
simultaneously choose their quantities, qi. Each player i has an inverse demand
function p(Q) where Q =
∑N
i=1 qi, and a cost function ci(qi). As a result, the
profit function for each player i becomes: Πi(qi) = p(Q)qi − ci(qi). Solving this
game can be done by introducing best response functions, also called reaction
functions. A best response is the strategy that produces the best outcome for a
player, taking other players’ strategies as given. The best response function for
player i is found by maximizing the profit function with respect to his own strategy
qi. The intersection between the reaction functions constitutes the Cournot-Nash
Equilibrium, which is simply the Nash Equilibrium when the strategies consist of
quantities.
The Cournot Game can be illustrated with an example: Two firms, A and B,
compete in the same market. qA and qB describe the quantities produced by each
of the firms, while the inverse demand function is denoted by p(Q) = a−Q, where
Q = qA + qB. Both firms have identical cost functions that follows: ci(qi) = b · qi.
This results in the following profit functions for the two firms:
ΠA(qA, qB) = (a− qA − qB) · qA − b · qA (5.3.1)
ΠB(qA, qB) = (a− qA − qB) · qB − b · qB (5.3.2)
Differentiating each of the firms’ profit functions with respect to their own pro-
duced quantity gives the first-order conditions (FOC):
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∂ΠA(qA, qB)
∂qA
= a− 2qA − qB − b = 0 =⇒ qA = a− b
2
− qB
2
(5.3.3)
∂ΠB(qA, qB)
∂qB
= a− 2qB − qA − b = 0 =⇒ qB = a− b
2
− qA
2
(5.3.4)
Inserting (5.3.3) in (5.3.4) and solving for qA and qB gives:
qA = qB =
a− b
3
and p =
a+ 2b
3
(5.3.5)
Accordingly the Cournot-Nash Equilibrium is qeq = (a−b
3
, a−b
3
), that is, none of the
players has anything to earn by deviating from their strategy.
Proving uniqueness of the solution requires a set of assumptions: The inverse
demand function pi and the cost functions ci are twice differentiable: ∂pi∂qi , −∂ci∂qi < 0
and ∂
2pi
∂q2i
, −∂2ci
∂q2i
≤ 0 in an interval [0, ]. Seeing that epsilon is given when p() = 0,
and as it is unreasonable to have negative prices: p(s) = 0 for s > . Szidarovszky
and Yakowitz [1977] proved that, under these conditions, there exists exactly one
equilibrium point.
5.4 Generalized Nash Equilibrium
In a standard form of a cooperative game it is usually assumed that the feasible set
of the game is composed of the full Cartesian product of the individual strategy
sets. In other words, it is assumed that the players can only affect the utilities of
the other players, but not their feasible sets (Harker [1991] and Arrow and Debreu
[1954]). However, in a Generalized Nash Equilibrium (GNE) each player’s feasible
set can depend on the rival players’ strategies. In other words, they can share a
common strategy set, x ∈ Rn, which is usually assumed to be non-empty, closed
and convex. A vector x∗ = (x∗1, x∗2, ..., x∗n) ∈ X is called a GNE if:
ui(x
∗) ≥ ui(x∗1, x∗2, ..., x∗n), ∀xi : (xi, x∗−i) ∈ X, ∀i ∈ I (5.4.1)
Typical applications for GNE may be oligopoly models using joint resources and
network problems with capacity constraints. According to Harker [1991] GNEs can
be converted to quasi-variational inequalities (QVI). QVIs are difficult to solve,
and no general uniqueness results exist for the QVI problem. It is possible to
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establish conditions that ensure uniqueness, but these conditions are often overly
restrictive. Thus, uniqueness is a rarity for QVI problems.
5.5 KKT Conditions
In a general form, the nonlinear programming problem is to find a vector x =
(x1, x2, ..., xn) so as to:
max
x
f(x) (5.5.1)
s.t. gi(x) ≤ bi, ∀i ∈ I (5.5.2)
x ≥ 0 (5.5.3)
where f(x) and the gi(x) are given functions of the n decision variables.
In nonlinear programming problems, where the objective function or the con-
straints are nonlinear, there are both necessary and sufficient conditions for opti-
mality. Table 5.5.1 summarizes this for different problem structures.
Problem Necessary conditions Also sufficient if
One-variable constrained df
dx
= 0 f(x) concave
Multivariable unconstrained ∂f(xj)
∂xj
= 0 f(x) concave
Constrained, non-negative ∂f(xj)
∂xj
= 0 f(x) concave
General constrained problem KKT conditions f(x) and gi(x) concave
Table 5.5.1: Necessary and sufficient conditions for optimality for different problem
structures.
For the general case, the KKT conditions are necessary for a solution to be optimal.
Their basic result can be embodied in the following theorem stated in Hillier and
Lieberman [2005]:
Theorem: Assume that f(x), g1(x), g2(x), ..., gm(x) are differentiable functions
satisfying certain regularity conditions. Then x∗ = (x∗1, x∗2, ..., x∗n) can be an opti-
mal solution for the nonlinear programming problem only if there exist m numbers
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λ1, λ2, ..., λm such that all the following KKT conditions are satisfied:
df
dxj
−
m∑
i=1
λi
∂gi
∂xj
≤ 0, at x = x∗, ∀j ∈ J (5.5.4)
x∗j(
df
dxj
−
m∑
i=1
λi
∂gi
∂xj
) = 0, at x = x∗, ∀j ∈ J (5.5.5)
gi(x
∗)− bi ≤ 0, ∀i ∈ I (5.5.6)
λi[gi(x
∗)− bi] = 0, ∀i ∈ I (5.5.7)
x∗j ≥ 0, ∀j ∈ J (5.5.8)
λi ≥ 0, ∀i ∈ I (5.5.9)
Corollary: Assume that f(x) is a concave function and that g1(x), g2(x), ..., gm(x)
are convex functions (i.e. this problem is a convex programming problem) where
all these functions satisfy the regularity conditions. Then x∗ = (x∗1, x∗2, ..., x∗n) is
an optimal solution if and only if all the conditions of the theorem are satisfied.
5.6 Model Classes
The structure of the objective function and the constraints define the character of
a complementarity problem. The following section presents the most important
groupings and their mathematical characteristics.
5.6.1 Variational Inequalities
The theory of Variational Inequalities (VI) is a powerful unifying methodology
for the study of equilibrium problems. The theory provides tools for formulating
a variety of equilibrium problems as VIs and provide qualitative analysis of the
problems in terms of existence and uniqueness of solutions, stability and sensitivity
analysis and efficient algorithms for computational purposes. Formally VIs can be
formulated as:
Given a subset K of the Euclidean n-dimensional space Rn and a mapping F :
K → Rn, the Variational Inequality, denoted VI(K,F) is to find a vector x ∈ K
such that (Facchinei and Pang [2003]):
(y − x)Tf(x) ≥ 0, ∀y ∈ K (5.6.1)
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The set of solutions to this problem is denoted SOL(K,F). Nash Equilibriums with
independent strategy sets can be viewed as VIs (Lions and Stampacchia [1967]).
5.6.2 Linear Complementarity Problems
If the constraints of the complementarity problem are exclusively linear and con-
tains exogenous parameters, the problem can be regarded as an Linear Comple-
mentarity Problem (LCP). Mathematically the LCP consists of finding a vector
x ∈ Rn, such that (Cottle et al. [2009]):
x ≥ 0 (5.6.2)
q +Mx ≥ 0 (5.6.3)
xT (q +Mx) = 0 (5.6.4)
for a given vector q ∈ Rn and a matrix M ∈ Rn×n. The problem is simply denoted
LCP (q,M).
5.6.3 Nonlinear Complementarity Problems
As opposed to the linear requirements in the LCP formulation, Nonlinear Comple-
mentarity Problem (NCP) allows for nonlinearity in its set of constraints. Cottle
et al. [2009] describes an NCP as finding a vector x such that:
x ≥ 0
f(x) ≥ 0
xTf(x) ≥ 0
(5.6.5)
where f(x) is a given mapping from Rn into itself.
5.6.4 Mixed Complementarity Problems
LCPs, NCPs and finite-dimensional VIs can be generalized to Mixed Complemen-
tarity Problems (MCP). An MCP consists of both complementarity conditions and
equality/inequality constraints. In a multiplayer game, an MCP formulation has
the unique properties of giving the solution to all players’ optimization problems
simultaneously. Formally the MCP can be written as:
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Given the matrices A ∈ Rn×n, B ∈ Rm×m, C ∈ Rn×m , D ∈ Rm×n, a ∈ Rn and
b ∈ Rm. The MCP is to find vectors u ∈ Rn and v ∈ Rm such that (Cottle et al.
[2009]):
a+ Au+ cv = 0 (5.6.6)
b+Du+Bv ≥ 0 (5.6.7)
v ≥ 0 (5.6.8)
vT (b+Du+Bv) = 0 (5.6.9)
where (5.6.6) - (5.6.8) represent an LCP and (5.6.9) represents the complementarity
condition.
According to Rutherford [2002] MCPs can incorporate mixtures of equations and
inequalities and because of this express a variety of economic models for both
markets and games.
An MCP can be formulated by deriving the KKT conditions of an optimization
problem. In a multiplayer game, the aggregated KKT conditions will form an
equilibrium problem that can be solved as an MCP.
5.6.5 Mathematical Programs with Equilibrium Constraints
Mathematical Programs with Equilibrium Constraints (MPEC) are present if the
constraints itself is the result of an equilibrium problem and the objective function
is a single players’ optimization problem.
The two-stage Stackelberg game described in Von Stackelberg [1952] can be for-
mulated as an MPEC where the top level is a dominant company and the bottom
level is the rest of the market. The MPEC can be formulated as follows where y
solves the MCP:
max
x
f(x, y)
s.t. (x, y) ∈ Z
a ≤ x ≤ b
(5.6.10)
MPECs are in general non-convex and non-differentiable problems. Thus, it is
difficult and computationally challenging to find a global optimal point, as the
FOCs are not sufficient for optimality (Midthun [2007b]).
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5.6.6 Equilibrium Programs with Equilibrium Constraints
An Equilibrium Program with Equilibrium Constraints (EPEC) is a multi-leader
follower game, where each leader is solving an MPEC. Thus, the objective function
gives the solution to another equilibrium problem. The general EPEC can be
formulated as:
max
z
f(z)
s.t. min(G(z), H(z) = 0
g(z) ≤ 0
h(z) = 0
(5.6.11)
An issue with EPECs is that they in general are non-convex problems, and ex-
istence of a solution is not necessarily guaranteed even under standard compact-
ness assumptions. Although one should find a solution you cannot guarantee for
uniqueness (Midthun [2007b]).
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Basic Production Model
This chapter presents a limited production model designed to illustrate market
power and how it affects price, quantity and the social welfare in a market game.
Section 6.1 opens with a discussion of assumptions and simplifications made in
order to get an adequate description of the market situation. The model formula-
tion, including notations, definitions and the sets of equations, is given in Section
6.2. Section 6.3 presents the results and some concluding remarks.
6.1 Assumptions and Simplifications
This model focuses on the fundamental pieces that is required to describe an
energy market. The modeling work starts out at the very basic, with two producers
meeting an external demand for natural gas. Additional complexity is added when
nodes and competition among producers are assigned to the model. This single-
commodity model will form the basis of a more comprehensive multi-commodity
model described in Chapter 7 and contains important deliberations used in the
subsequent chapters.
A production problem in its simplest form can be described by a single producer
selling its products to a consumer. The producer seeks to maximize his profit of
selling its products subtracted the cost involved in the production process. He
faces a capacity constraint of production that limits his total production and a
constraint forcing him to produce a positive amount of goods.
To make the model a bit more realistic, we add a nodal structure of two nodes
in the network with a single producer located in each of the nodes (Figure 6.1.1).
Each of the nodes contains a market for gas that is not interfering with each
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other. The producers can choose to sell the gas in either its own node or in
the neighboring node. The two producers are the only market players present in
this example. Depending on the market situation they can behave strategically
against each other as of Cournot, i.e. produce the optimal amount of gas given the
production of the other producer in the network.
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Figure 6.1.1: Nodal structure of the basic production model.
We also assume that the two markets for natural gas are characterized by their
own inverse linear demand curve (Appendix A.1.1), where the total demand for
natural gas in the node is aggregated into one single demand curve. Hence, these
inverse demand curves represents the total demand of natural gas in the respective
node.
This structure is of course a large simplification of the real world situation, but will
serve as a good starting point for understanding the concept of strategic behavior.
6.2 Formulation of the Basic Model
This model intends to describe the fundamental mechanisms of equilibrium pro-
gramming and how a small production example can be analyzed through a game
theoretic framework.
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6.2.1 Declarations
The following notations are valid for the basic model:
Indices
n Nodes in the network. (a, b) ∈ N
i Producers in the network. (g1, g2) ∈ I
Sets
N The set of all nodes in the network
I The set of all producers in the network
Data
PRODCAPi Capacity limit of production of producer i
INTn Intersection point of the inverse demand curve in node n
SLPn Slope of the inverse demand curve in node n
Ai Linear cost factor in the cost function of producer i
Bi Quadratic cost factor in the cost function of producer i
MPin Market power parameter of producer i in node n
Variables
qin Sold quantity of producer i to node n
λi Lagrange multiplier of production constraint
in producer i’s problem
pn Price of natural gas in node n
Functions
Πi Profit function of producer i
Ci Cost function of producer i
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6.2.2 Production Cost, Revenues and Profit
The production involves different types of cost depending on each production pro-
cess. For modeling purposes it is beneficial to avoid unnecessary complexity by
combining variables. (6.2.1) aggregates all costs related to the production process
into a single cost function that depends on the total production by each producer
only. This will simplify the modeling and ease the search for relevant data.
Ca + Cb + · · ·+ Cs ≈ C = Ci
(∑
n
qin
)
(6.2.1)
In order to guarantee optimality we need to assume that the aggregated production
cost function denoted Ci(qin) has either linear or quadratic properties. This will
ensure convexity of the problem and the KKT conditions will provide optimal
solutions (Section 5.5).
Thus, we assume the cost functions to have quadratic shape following (6.2.2):
Ci(qin) = Ai ·
∑
n
qin +Bi ·
(∑
n
qin
)2
(6.2.2)
The two producers’ profits come from sales to the internal and external market
subtracted the cost from production. This function will form the objective function
in which both producers seeks to maximize. Due to the nature of both the demand
and cost function, the objective function will have a quadratic shape.
Πi =
∑
n
pn · qin − Ci
(∑
n
qin
)
(6.2.3)
6.2.3 Optimization Program
The gas producer imaximizes profit in accordance with the rationality assumptions
listed in Section 5.3. He gains profit from sales to customers at a price pn subtracted
the cost related to the production process. The production of gas is constrained
by the production limit PRODCAPi.
Based on the assumptions in Section 6.1 each producer i is given the following
optimization program:
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max
qin
Πi =
∑
n
pn · qin − Ci
(∑
n
qin
)
, ∀i (6.2.4)
s.t.
∑
n
qin ≤ PRODCAPi, (λi), ∀i (6.2.5)
qin ≥ 0, ∀i, n (6.2.6)
where (6.2.4) represents the objective function of producer i, (6.2.5) the capacity
constraint of production and (6.2.6) the fact all production has to be non-negative.
We convert the problem into a minimization problem to solve it as a complemen-
tarity model. By inverting the signs of the objective function and restructuring
the constraints, the related minimization problem becomes:
min
qin
−Πi = −
∑
n
pn · qin + Ci
(∑
n
qin
)
, ∀i (6.2.7)
s.t. PRODCAPi −
∑
n
qin ≥ 0, (λi), ∀i (6.2.8)
qin ≥ 0, ∀i, n (6.2.9)
Deriving the first-order conditions (FOCs) give the Karush-Kuhn-Tucker condi-
tions of this minimization problem:
0 ≤ −pn −MPin · SLPn · qin +
∂Ci
(∑
n qin
)
∂qin
+ λi ⊥ qin ≥ 0, ∀i, n (6.2.10)
0 ≤ PRODCAPi −
∑
n
qin ⊥ λi ≥ 0, ∀i (6.2.11)
The KKT conditions will provide optimal solutions to the problem as long as the
problem structure is strictly convex. The fact that we have convex cost functions,
the negative of the profit functions are strictly concave and we are dealing with
convex sets of constraints we will end up with an optimal solution to the prob-
lem. An essential feature of expressing strategic behavior, is the market power
parameter MPin. This parameter will be explained and given a thorough study in
Chapter 7.
The market clearing condition for the producer i is formed by the inverse demand
function of market n:
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pn(qn) = INTn +
∑
i
SLPn · qin, (pn free), ∀n (6.2.12)
where pn represents the dual variable of the market clearing condition in (6.2.12).
As pn is dual to an equality it is not restricted to positive. Consequently, sufficient
input data is necessary to assure positive prices.
6.3 Results
We want to analyze the impact of market power on a small gas market and con-
trast the results to relevant theory. The model is run for several market scenarios
including monopoly, perfect competition and a Cournot oligopoly. The following
section highlights the results and points out implications used in Section 7. The in-
put data are not reflecting real values, but are considered sufficient for the purpose
this model serves.
Table 6.3.1 and Table 6.3.2 present the producers’ and consumers’ numbers for
the chosen market structures. We know from theory in Appendix A.2 that rela-
tive to a perfectly competitive firm, a monopolist will restrict output in order to
increase price. It can be shown that given the same demand and cost structures,
the Cournot duopoly will choose a price/output combination that is between the
monopoly and the perfectly competitive firm. Hence, the Cournot duopoly will,
without collusion, restrict output to a level that elevates prices above the competi-
tive amount, and thus allow the firms to earn above perfectly competitive (but not
monopoly) profits. Table 6.3.1 and Table 6.3.2 confirm just that, showing that the
volumes and prices of the Cournot duopoly are between the two market extremes.
PC Cournot Monopoly
Producer Prod M/S PS Prod M/S PS Prod M/S PS
Producer 1 33 50% 0 25 50% 150 32 100% 534
Producer 2 33 50% 0 25 50% 150 - - -
Total 66 100% 0 50 100% 300 32 100% 534
Table 6.3.1: Production (GW), market share (%) and producer surplus (e) for
different market structures.
Furthermore, we can verify the relationship between the producer and consumer
surplus in the different scenarios. According to Appendix A.2 the monopolist will
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set marginal revenue equal to marginal cost and therefore induce a deadweight loss
that extracts some of the consumer surplus. Perfect competition represents the
opposite case where the producer sets price equal to marginal cost and maximizes
consumer surplus. Both scenarios are verified by the results displayed in Figure
6.3.1.
PC Cournot Monopoly
Market Cons Price CS Cons Price CS Cons Price CS
Market 1 33 17 534 25 25 300 16 34 133
Market 2 33 17 534 25 25 300 16 34 133
Total 66 - 1,068 50 - 600 32 - 266
Table 6.3.2: Consumption (GW), price (e/GJ) and consumer surplus (e) for
different market structures.
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Figure 6.3.1: Welfare results (e) for each market structure in the basic production
model.
43
CHAPTER 6. BASIC PRODUCTION MODEL
44
Chapter 7
Strategic MCP Model of Gas and
Electricity Markets
This chapter gives a complete strategic MCP formulation of a simplified gas and
electricity market in Northern Europe. Similar to the previous chapter, Section 7.1
lists the assumptions and simplifications required to describe the market through a
proper model. Section 7.2 presents the nodal network, definitions and declarations.
Each players’ optimization problem is described in Section 7.3.
7.1 Assumptions
Energy markets are difficult to model, considering the number of actors in the mar-
ket and the complexity of their interaction with each other. When one player’s
optimization problem depends not only on his own decision, but also on other
players’ decisions a strategic problem is present. Both electricity and natural gas
are network industries, meaning that they are highly dependent on the infras-
tructure and how efficiently it is used. This model aims at a comprehensive and
accurate representation of the transmission network to capture these properties.
Based on the current situation in Northern Europe, we assume two liberalized, but
oligopolistic markets allowing for market power.
The model extends the simplified model stated in Chapter 6. It is based on myopic
and deterministic assumptions, meaning that time dependency and stochasticity
are not implemented, and future events are omitted. Hence, each player optimizes
his action with respect to today’s situation only and uncertainties are ignored in
the decision-making. These assumptions are obviously not reflecting reality and
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how market actors actually make their decisions, but we consider it necessary to
make these assumptions in order to simplify the modeling process sufficiently.
We have chosen to represent the gas and electricity market in Northern Europe by
the nodes of Norway, Germany and Great Britain. Ideally, we would include all
countries in the region, but considering the increased complexity of the modeling
task and the purpose this model serves, we find it sufficient to limit ourselves to
the three countries above. There are several reasons to choose Norway, Germany
and Great Britain over the others countries of Northern Europe. Firstly, they
are large contributors to the trade of both commodities in the region. Secondly,
they are interconnected by a well-developed infrastructural network allowing for
intensive trade between the countries. Thirdly, they are highly dependent of each
others behavior, both on the supply and demand side of the market. Thus, we are
confident that the reality and dynamics of the market situation will be preserved
modeling those countries.
The relevant oligopolistic representation will differ from industry to industry but is
likely to be based on the variable that cannot be altered in the short-run. From Ap-
pendix A.2 we know that Cournot competition is to be expected when firms make
output decisions that are hard to change. These usually involve capacity, qual-
ity or location specific decisions where prices adjust to these decisions. Bertrand
competition represent the opposite scenario, where firms commit to prices that
are hard to change or when quantities can be adjusted quickly. The fact that ca-
pacity constraints limit price competition while excess capacity encourages price
competition, indicates that a Cournot representation is preferable of expressing
oligopolistic features in the following model.
As shown in Table 7.1.1, we assume that all of the players are profit maximizers
and that we are allowing for strategic behavior (Cournot) between the producers
in the network, satisfying the related features. As mentioned in Section 5.3, we
distinguish between pure and mixed strategies in the decision making. Because
of the numerical difficulties mixed strategies cause, we do not allow the players
to operate with mixed strategies, but merely in pure strategies. We are also
assuming that every player acts rationally and has complete information about the
other players. This is an essential feature of multiplayer games and a necessary
assumption to make in order to express strategic behavior mathematically (Section
5.1).
We do not allow for shared strategy sets where players compete on the same set of
resources, e.g. a gas producer in Norway cannot produce from the same gas fields as
a German gas producer. Instead we are assuming that each player operates from
individual sets of resources. Accordingly we are not facing a Generalized Nash
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Equilibrium making the problem less complicated to solve (Section 5.4). We are
also assuming that there are no market leaders present in the game, implicating
that the model is not an MPEC nor an EPEC.
Analyzing each and every consumer individually would be impractical to model.
Instead we have chosen to aggregate the consumers into larger groups within each
sector. This makes the model more comprehendible, without losing too much
information as we would by aggregating all of the end-users into one large group.
We have divided the consumers into two categories depending on their consumption
pattern: Household and Industry. Each group in each node has their own demand
function with respect to either gas or electricity.
We assume the inverse demand functions p(q) and the cost functions C(q) to be
twice differentiable:
∂p(q)
∂q
,−∂C(q)
∂q
< 0 and
∂2p(q)
∂q2
,−∂
2C(q)
∂q2
≤ 0 (7.1.1)
Hence, we can guarantee for uniqueness and existence of a solution (Section 5.3).
Similar to Egging et al. [2008], we implement the conjectural variation parameter
MPfinj ∈ [0, 1] to express market power in the model. A value of MPfinj = 0
characterizes perfectly competitive behavior by a player, which means that the
player’s action will not affect the market outcome. However, if MPfinj = 1 we
will have a Cournot behavior where player i consider all the other players −i
Actor Role Comment
Natural Gas
Producer
Produce gas and sell to
end-users and electricity
producers.
Can exert market power by behaving
strategically against other gas pro-
ducers.
Electricity
Producer
Produce electricity and
sell to end-users.
Can exert market power by behaving
strategically against other electricity
producers.
Network
Operator
Assign transfer capaci-
ties to gas and electricity
producers.
Perfectly competitive. Assigns ca-
pacities on a marginal willingness to
pay basis.
End-user Consume gas and elec-
tricity.
Divided into a gas and electricity
market for both households and in-
dustry in each node.
Table 7.1.1: Market actors and their position in the market.
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quantities as fixed. Values of the parameter in the interval: 0 < MPfinj < 1 are
not well explained in theory, but they can have relevance in order to decide on
deviation from the market extremes. Details on different market structures and
its characteristics is given in Appendix A.2.
7.2 Model Formulation
The model intends to analyze strategic choices made from different actors through
a simplified value chain representation of the energy market in Northern Europe.
Using fundamentals of equilibrium programming we can examine price and volumes
effects of gas and electricity in the region.
7.2.1 Declarations
The following notations apply to the multi-commodity model presented in this
chapter. Note that both markets, nodes and fuels are represented with multiple
indices. Accordingly, a transfer from one node to another is indexed by (i, j). For
the same reason we write (n,m) between two markets. The same notations applies
for the fuels included in the model.
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Indices
(n,m) Markets in the network
(HH(NG), HH(EL), IN(NG), IN(EL)) ∈ N
(i, j, l) Nodes in the network. (NO,DE,GB) ∈ I
(f, g) Fuels in the network. (NG,EL) ∈ F
Sets
N The set of all markets in the network
I The set of all nodes in the network
F The set of all fuels in the network
Data
ARCCAPfij Capacity limit of commodity f on arc (i, j)
PRODCAPfi Capacity limit of energy production of producer (f, i)
SALESCAPfinj Capacity limit of sales from producer (f, i)
to market n in node j
TRADECAPfij Capacity limit of trade from producer (f, i)
to node j
CONV CAPfi Converting capacity of of producer (f, i)
INTni Intersection point of the inverse demand curve
of market n in node i
SLPni Slope of the inverse demand curve of market n in node i
Afi Linear cost factor in the cost function of producer (f, i)
CONV Conversion factor in converting gas to electricity
ARCCOSTfij Unit cost of transporting commodity f on arc (i, j)
MPfinj Market power parameter of producer (f, i)
in market n in node j
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Variables
qPRODfi Produced quantity of producer (f, i)
qSALESfinj Sold quantity of producer (f, i) to market n in node j
qTRADEfij Traded quantity from producer (f, i) to node j
xTRADEfi Producer (f, i)’s received trade
qFLOWfij Physical flow of commodity f on arc (i, j)
λfinj Lagrange multiplier of sales constraint
in producer (f, i)’s problem
ρfi Lagrange multiplier of production constraint
in producer (f, i)’s problem
κfij Lagrange multiplier of trading constraint
between producer (f, i) and node j
φfi Lagrange multiplier of flow conservation constraint
in producer (f, i)’s problem
ωfij Lagrange multiplier of the arc limit constraint
of commodity f on arc (i, j)
τfi Lagrange multiplier of the capacity converting constraint
of producer (f, i)
bpi Border price of gas in node i
tfeefij Lagrange multiplier of the flow equation of f on arc (i, j)
pni Price of energy of market n in node i
Functions
ΠPRfi Profit function of producer (f, i)
ΠNOfij Profit function of network operator (f, i, j)
CPRfi Cost function of producer (f, i)
CNOfij Cost function of network operator (f, i, j)
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7.2.2 Network Description
Nodes and Markets
We have summarized the market situation and the interaction between the players
in Figure 7.2.1. As the figure illustrates, the countries of Norway, Germany and
Great Britain constitute the nodes in the network. This partitioning with respect
to countries is used by Huppmann et al. [2009] and gives a detailed description of
the energy trade. The model describes a snapshot of the market situation without
time dependency. Hence, all trading is made on the spot market for both electricity
and gas. The fact that most of the gas produced in Europe has been committed
to take-or-pay (TOP) contracts would be impractical to implement as the time
perspective is omitted.
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Figure 7.2.1: Markets, nodes and actors and the interaction between them.
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According to the geographical location of the nodes and the present trade situation,
each node can have the following activities: production, consumption, import and
export. We allow for only one producer of of each commodity in each node. This
is justified by observations in several countries of Europe, such as GdF in France
and Gazprom in Russia that represents for the majority of the gas production in
its country. We find somewhat the same pattern in the electricity market, where
EdF, as an example, act as the dominant electricity producer in France.
Arcs
Each node in the network is connected to neighboring nodes through arcs. The
existing gas and electricity networks in Northern Europe form the basis of this
network and serve the flow between the nodes. The current LNG-flow between
Norway, Germany and Great Britain is negligible compared to gas trade through
pipelines1. As a result, we do not include the possibility of transporting LNG
from export terminals to import terminals among countries in the network. This
justifies the assumption of a myopic model as it would be meaningless to implement
the storage features of LNG without including a time horizon.
In cases where the neighboring nodes are not directly connected to the other
nodes through existing arcs, the model allows for transition through other nodes
to facilitate trade. This allows for two-way gas transfer between Great Britain
and Germany even though they are not directly connected by arcs. In this case,
Netherlands and Belgium act as dummy nodes allowing for transfer between the
countries, subjected to a transfer fee. The same applies for electricity transfer from
Germany to Norway where Sweden and Denmark acts as transitioning dummy
nodes. The arc capacity will be determined by the minimum capacity on the arc
from the exporting node, via the dummy node(s) and into the importing node.
The model does not include local distribution to consumers within a node. This
means that gas and electricity that is consumed in a node is not location specific.
It is consumed somewhere within the node by one of the consuming sectors, but
we do not know the exact location.
1BP [2009] indicates that Norway was the only country in the network that exported LNG.
A transfer of 0.33 GJ of LNG from Norway to Great Britain is roughly one percent of the
corresponding pipeline trade.
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7.3 Optimization Problems
The following section addresses each players’ optimization problem with belonging
assumptions. In a multiplayer game like energy markets, we can aggregate the
KKT conditions of each player and combine these with each of the players’ market
clearing conditions to form a set of equations. This gives us a market equilibrium
model, which can be transformed into an MCP and solved (Section 5.6.4). In
principle, a model like this could be solved by optimization but the presence of
market power makes it necessary to transform it into an MCP model and solve it
accordingly.
7.3.1 Producer
The production is done separately by each of the producers in the respective nodes,
i.e. none of the production fields are operated by multiple producers. That being
the case the producer (f, i) operates alone in its own node and assumed to be a
profit-maximizing player with the possibility of exerting market power. As Cournot
player he will behave strategically against the other producers in the network and
decide on his decision variables based on the other producers’ decisions.
His revenues comes from sales to end-users qSALESfinj in market n at a price pnj and
sales to other producers qTRADEfij at a price bpj. Ergo, electricity producers can buy
a quantity of xTRADEfi gas at a price bpj and convert it to electricity, penalized by
the conversion factor CONV , resulting in a net amount of energy xTRADEfi ·CONV .
Thus, electricity producers are assumed to produce from all available resources in
his node except from natural gas, that he can buy from the gas producer.
The producer (f, i) will experience a cost related to the production process denoted
by CPR(qPRODfi ). He will also face a cost of transferring qSALESfinj to market n at
transfer fee tfeefij. The cost of converting gas to electricity is included in a lower
efficiency factor CONV .
In order to guarantee optimality we need to assume that the production cost
CPR(qprodi ) has either linear or quadratic properties. This will ensure convexity
of the problem and the KKT conditions will provide optimal solutions (Section
5.5). Golombek et al. [1995] claims that this is a reasonable assumption to make
in the gas and electricity industry. Quadratic cost data are hard to derive, thus
we assume the cost function to have the following linear shape:
CPR(qPRODfi ) = Afi · qPRODfi , ∀f, i (7.3.1)
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where Afi is a constant in the cost function.
We also assume that producer and exporter are closely related and acting as one
single actor (represented as the producer) in the network. The fact that most of
the large-scale gas producers has their own export-unit within the firm, makes this
is a fair assumption. Even though each unit serve different purposes, they are tied
under the same umbrella. Hence, the producing unit and the exporting unit do
not behave strategically against each other.
Based on the assumptions above, each producer (f, i) is given the following opti-
mization program:
max
qPRODfi
qTRADEfij
qSALESfinj
xTRADEfi
ΠPRfi =
∑
j∈I
qTRADEfij · bpj −
∑
j∈I
qTRADEfij · tfeefij
+
∑
j∈I
∑
n∈N
qSALESfinj · pnj −
∑
j∈I
∑
n∈N
qSALESfinj · tfeefij (7.3.2)
− xTRADEfi · bpi − Afi · qPRODfi ∀f, i
s.t. qPRODfi ≤ PRODCAPfi, (ρfi), ∀f, i (7.3.3)
qSALESfinj ≤ SALESCAPfinj, (λfinj), ∀f, i, n, j (7.3.4)
qTRADEfij ≤ TRADECAPfij, (κfij), ∀f, i, j (7.3.5)
xTRADEfi ≤ CONV CAPfi, (τfi), ∀f, i (7.3.6)
qPRODfi =
∑
j∈I
∑
n∈N
qSALESfinj +
∑
j∈I
qTRADEfij
− CONV · xTRADEfi , (φfi), ∀f, i (7.3.7)
qPRODfi ,q
SALES
finj , q
TRADE
fij , x
TRADE
fi ≥ 0, ∀f, i, n, j (7.3.8)
where (7.3.2) represents the profit function. (7.3.3) limits the total production.
(7.3.4) ensures that sales to market n in node j do not exceed its capacity. (7.3.5)
makes sure each gas producer does not exceed the capacity of selling to electricity
producer in node j. The latter two restrictions are included to link the producers,
markets and nodes rather than constraining the sales and trade. As a result, the
upper limits of (7.3.4) and (7.3.5) take large values. (7.3.6) limits the converting
capacity of an electricity producer. (7.3.7) ensures that the total production by
each producer (f, i) and the received quantity from gas producer (g, j) to electricity
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producer (f, i) equals the total sales to all markets n i nodes j and the traded
quantity of gas from producer (f, i) to electricity producer (g, j). (7.3.8) forces the
production, sales and trade and received trade to be positive.
For the same reasons as of Section 6.2.3, we convert the problem into a minimiza-
tion problem to solve it as a complementarity model:
min
qPRODfi
qTRADEfij
qSALESfinj
xTRADEfi
−ΠPRfi =−
∑
j∈I
qTRADEfij · bpj +
∑
j∈I
qTRADEfij · tfeefij
−
∑
j∈I
∑
n∈N
qSALESfinj · pnj +
∑
j∈I
∑
n∈N
qSALESfinj · tfeefij (7.3.9)
+ xTRADEfi · bpi + Afi · qPRODfi ∀f, i
s.t. PRODCAPfi − qPRODfi ≥ 0, (ρfi), ∀f, i (7.3.10)
SALESCAPfinj − qSALESfinj ≥ 0, (λfinj), ∀f, i, n, j (7.3.11)
TRADECAPfij − qTRADEfij ≥ 0, (κfij), ∀f, i, j (7.3.12)
CONV CAPfi − xTRADEfi ≥ 0, (τfi), ∀f, i (7.3.13)
qPRODfi + CONV · xTRADEfi
−
∑
j∈I
∑
n∈N
qSALESfinj −
∑
j∈I
qTRADEfij = 0, (φfi), ∀f, i (7.3.14)
qPRODfi , q
SALES
finj , q
TRADE
fij , x
TRADE
fi ≥ 0, ∀f, i, n, j (7.3.15)
Deriving the KKT conditions of the minimization problem is necessary for the
MCP formulation. According to Section 5.5 the KKTs of this formulation are
sufficient for optimality because of concave properties of the objective function
and the convex set of constraints:
Given the market power assumption described in Section 7.1, we implement the
factor MPfinj =
∂pn(qSALESfinj )
∂qSALESfinj
representing the market power of producer (f, i) in
market n of node j. If the producer operates as a Cournot player this factor will
be multiplied with the slope of the demand curve of market n:
∂pn
∂qn
=
pREF
qREF
· 1
ε
= SLPn ·MPfinj (7.3.16)
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where (qREFn , pREFn ) denotes the reference point for the demand in node n and ε
the price elasticity of demand.
For a price-taker however, the market power factor will take the value zero, mean-
ing that the contribution of producer (f, i) will not change the price.
As a result, the KKT conditions for the producer become:
0 ≤ Afi + ρfi − φfi ⊥ qPRODfi ≥ 0, ∀f, i (7.3.17)
0 ≤ −pnj −MPfinj · qSALESfinj · SLPnj
+ tfeefij + λfinj + φfi ⊥ qSALESfinj ≥ 0, ∀f, i, n, j (7.3.18)
0 ≤ −bpj + tfeefij + κfij + φfi ⊥ qTRADEfij ≥ 0, ∀f, i, j (7.3.19)
0 ≤ bpi − CONV · φfi + τfi ⊥ xTRADEfi ≥ 0, ∀f, i (7.3.20)
0 ≤ PRODCAPfi − qPRODfi ⊥ ρfi ≥ 0, ∀f, i (7.3.21)
0 ≤ SALESCAPfinj − qSALESfinj ⊥ λfinj ≥ 0, ∀f, i, n, j (7.3.22)
0 ≤ TRADECAPfij − qTRADEfij ⊥ κfij ≥ 0, ∀f, i, j (7.3.23)
0 ≤ CONV CAPfi − xTRADEfi ⊥ τfi ≥ 0, ∀f, i (7.3.24)
0 = qPRODfi + CONV · xTRADEfi
−
∑
j∈I
∑
n∈N
qSALESfinj −
∑
j∈I
qTRADEfij , (φfi free), ∀f, i (7.3.25)
where ρfi, λfinj, κfij and τfi are shadow prices of the capacity constraints in
(7.3.3), (7.3.4), (7.3.5) and (7.3.6) and represents the objective value of an extra
unit of capacity.
The total trade balance between the producers has to be maintained at equilibrium.
This forms the market clearing condition in (7.3.26):
∑
f∈F
∑
i∈I
qTRADEfij −
∑
f∈F
xTRADEfj = 0, (bpj free), ∀j (7.3.26)
where the dual variable bpj represents the border price of node j. This price is
dual to an equality, hence it is not restricted to be positive - it can be negative,
positive and even zero. In order to ensure positive prices the input data has to be
of sufficient quality.
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7.3.2 Network Operator
The network operator (f, i, j) is responsible for assigning pipeline and grid capac-
ities to the exporting producers. Similar to Egging et al. [2010] we assume Third
Party Access to the pipeline and grid network implying that the capacities are
allocated on a willingness-to-pay basis for the producers. We simplify our model
by ignoring friction and pressure drops in the pipeline network and effect losses
in the transmission grid. A good interpretation of this can be found in Midthun
[2007a].
The network operator experience a cost of transporting electricity and gas between
the nodes and markets. The cost CNOfij (qFLOWfij ) is assumed to be linear depending
on the volumes of transfer.
CNOfij (q
FLOW
fij ) = ARCCOSTfij · qFLOWfij , ∀f, i, j (7.3.27)
where ARCCOSTfij is the unit cost of transfer depending on the distance between
two nodes and the way of transfer.
The network operator is maximizing his profit from assigning an amount qFLOWfij
to a price tfeefij subtracted the cost related to operation CNOfij (qFLOWfij ).
We limit the model to one-directional arcs , even though both pipelines and trans-
mission grids theoretically could be bi-directional. In cases where the arcs are
bi-directional we model it as two one-directional arcs with separate capacity lim-
its.
The network operator’s optimization problem becomes:
max
qFLOWfij
ΠNOfij = q
FLOW
fij · tfeefij − ARCCOSTfij · qFLOWfij , ∀f, i, j (7.3.28)
s.t. qFLOWfij ≤ ARCCAPfij, (ωfij), ∀f, i, j (7.3.29)
qFLOWfij ≥ 0, ∀f, i, j (7.3.30)
where (7.3.28) represents the profit function. (7.3.29) limits the flow of f on arc
(i, j) and (7.3.30) ensures positive flows in the network.
The related minimization problem follows as:
min
qFLOWfij
−ΠNOfij = −qFLOWfij · tfeefij + ARCCOSTfij · qFLOWfij , ∀f, i, j (7.3.31)
s.t. ARCCAPfij − qFLOWfij ≥ 0, (ωfij), ∀f, i, j (7.3.32)
qFLOWfij ≥ 0, ∀f, i, j (7.3.33)
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For the same reasons as of the producer, we derive the KKT conditions for the
network operator’s minimization problem:
0 ≤ −tfeefij + ARCCOSTfij + ωfij ⊥ qFLOWfij ≥ 0, ∀f, i, j (7.3.34)
0 ≤ ARCCAPfij − qFLOWfij ⊥ ωfij ≥ 0, ∀f, i, j (7.3.35)
The fact that the flow of f on arc (i, j) has to equal the trade and the sales by the
producers, forms the market clearing conditions for the network operator:
qFLOWfij = q
TRADE
fij +
∑
n∈N
qSALESfinj , (tfeefij free), ∀f, i, j (7.3.36)
where the dual tfeefij of the market clearing can take both negative and positive
values.
7.3.3 End-User
End-users are located in each node and divided into four categories of consumption:
Household (NG), Household (EL), Industry (NG) and Industry (EL). Each of the
categories forms a market n in its own node and is assumed to have a linear inverse
demand functions of gas or electricity depending on the consuming sector.
The demand curves are aggregated such that each consumer group represents the
total demand of its group within the node. The curves are assumed to be defined
around a reference point of demand (qREFn , pREFn ) based on empirical measures of
price and consumption. As a result, the aggregated inverse demand curves of each
sector will take the following form:
pni = INTni + SLPni ·QSALESni , ∀n, i (7.3.37)
where QSALESni represent the total sales of all producers to market n in node i.
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Implementation
The following chapter presents important aspects of the implementation of the
model. Section 8.1 describes relevant software that is capable of expressing prob-
lems of the complementarity format. The implementation is described in Section
8.2 while specifications of the hardware is given in Section 8.3.
8.1 Software
The model requires software and a solver capable of finding optimal solutions
to MCP problems. The General Algebraic Modeling System (GAMS) modeling
language is a high-level modeling system designed for mathematical optimization
that allows for modeling in the complementarity format. The way GAMS is con-
structed, GAMS lets the users concentrate on the modeling instead of the solution
methodology.
The GAMS modeling language combined with the PATH solver support the com-
plementarity class of problems and can be used to find an optimal solution to the
problem. According to Ferris and Munson [2000], the PATH solver is based upon
a generalization of the classical Newton’s method plus a linearization solved using
a code related to Lemke’s method. There exist several solvers capable of finding
optimal solutions to MCP problems, but PATH has proven its considerable suc-
cess on similar problems earlier and is therefore desirable. An introduction to the
GAMS syntax is given in Rutherford [1995] and Rutherford [1999] while a detailed
description of PATH and its range of application can be found in Dirkse and Ferris
[1995].
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8.2 Implementation and Solution Approach
By combining the KKTs and the market clearing conditions in each of the players’
optimization problems we will end up with a market equilibrium model with an
MCP structure (Section 5.6.4). The fact that all cost functions are assumed to
be convex, the negative of the profit functions are strictly concave and we have
convex sets of constraints gives us an optimal solution to the problem.
The implementation of the model was done through the graphical user interface
GAMS IDE (Integrated Development Environment) that links the problem to the
chosen solver. GAMS IDE allows for editing, debugging and running the model
through the same graphical interface. By modeling in high-level languages such
as GAMS, the similarities between the syntax and the mathematical structure of
the problem are many, which eases the job of coding the model.
The model is purely deterministic, so it was sufficient to list the sets, parameters,
variables and equations in GAMS. Furthermore, the equations are paired up with
the corresponding dual variables from the mathematical description. GAMS do
not directly solve the problem, but interfaces with the external solver PATH that
provides the results. If the compilation is done successfully, GAMS IDE provides
a solution summary indicating whether or not the solution is optimal. All of
the equations and variables with corresponding values are listed in the solution
summary. As the model is deterministic it is sufficient to run the model once for
each set of input data. The input data varied for the different problem instances
so several iterations of the model were run, with the results manually documented.
The GAMS code of the model is included in Appendix B.2.
8.3 Hardware
All problem instances of the model are run on a Asus Eee PC with an Intel Atom
CPU N270 1,60 GHz Processor and 0,99 GB RAM. This was considered sufficient,
as the computational requirements by running the model were rather low.
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Data Sets
The following chapter contains relevant data sets applied for solving the model of
Section 7. Section 9.1 provides data and reasoning for the Base Case based on the
current situation in the gas and electricity markets of Northern Europe. Data for
different problem instances are listed in Section 9.2.
9.1 Current Situation and Base Case
Most of the data used in this model is based on the situation in 2009. We do not
consider seasonal variations over the year, thus annualized data sets are desired.
This alternative will not comprise peaks in consumption, production and trade,
but has its advantages of being representative for the whole year.
Production capacities for both natural gas and electricity are collected from the
International Energy Agency (IEA) (IEA [2010]) and based on statistics of 2009.
Converting capacities are assumed to be 5 percent more than current conversion
data listed in IEA [2010]. Cost of production estimates are collected from Obser-
vatoire Méditerranéen de l’Energie (OME) (OME [2002]) and the IEA. In cases
with lack of data we assume the production costs to be 25 percent of the average
market price within the node. Both data sets are presented in Table 9.1.1.
Network capacities between the nodes are taken from the European Network
of Transmission System Operators (ENTSO), ENTSO-G [2010] and ENTSO-E
[2010]. Table 9.1.2 summarizes the capacity balance between the nodes for the
different commodities.
Cross-border tariffs between each node in the electricity network are based on
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Natural Gas Electricity
Region Production Production Production Production Convert.capacity cost capacity cost capacity
NO 134.95 2.28 17.10 8.25 0.09
DE 17.02 2.57 74.20 7.99 25.39
GB 94.35 2.05 45.34 7.88 44.84
Table 9.1.1: Production capacities (GW), converting capacities (GW) and unit
production costs (e/GJ).
FINERGY [2003]. The electricity tariffs are depending on both the amount of
energy and the number of border crosses between the exporter and the buyer.
Transport fees for gas are based on average tariffs between countries in Europe
and have the same structure as for electricity. Table 9.1.2 displays the transport
costs of trading a commodity on a specific arc in the network.
Pipeline Transmission grid
From To Transport Transport Transport Transportcapacity cost capacity cost
NO DE 37.21 0.24 2.65
∗∗ 1.25
GB 81.14 0.24 - -
DE NO - - 2.10
∗∗ 1.25
GB 36.52∗ 0.71 - -
GB NO - - - -DE 13.39∗ 0.71 - -
*Includes transition through Netherlands and Belgium
**Includes transition through Denmark and Sweden
Table 9.1.2: Network capacities (GW) and cross-border tariffs (e/GJ) between
countries in the network. (-) represents connections without existing arcs.
Historically, the electricity production from natural gas has been done by so-called
single-cycle gas turbines generally converting the heat energy from combustion into
electricity at efficiencies of 35 to 40 percent. Today there are present high efficiency
power plants using technologies such as Natural Gas Combined Cycle (NGCC) or
Combined Cycle Gas Turbine (CCGT) that ensures efficiencies over 50 percent
depending on the size and layout of the installation. According to Song [2010] it
is fair to assume conversion efficiencies about 58 percent in Northern Europe. Due
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to lack of conversion cost data we assume the loss of energy of converting from
gas to electricity to be a cost itself. Accordingly, the efficiency factor of 58 percent
includes the cost of conversion.
The inverse demand curves of each market are derived using a reference point
(qREFn , pREFn ) for each of the consuming segments (the calculation is given in Ap-
pendix A.1.1). Looking at the reference consumption and reference price for 2009
(Eurostat [2010]) under the assumption of a fixed elasticity of demand ε, the de-
mand curves are estimated. We assume the elasticity of demand to take the value
ε = −1 for every natural gas market in each of the nodes. This value is rather
low compared to the estimates Bernstein and Griffin [2005] made for the American
gas market, but are justified by Holz [2009] in the natural gas markets of Europe.
Empirical estimates by Halvorsen and Larsen [2001] concludes with a similar value
of the price elasticity of demand in the residential market for electricity in Norway.
Lack of sufficient data makes us use this value for the electricity markets for both
industry and households in the other nodes. Table 9.1.3 presents the estimated
demand curves of each market in the network.
Natural Gas Electricity
Region Industry Household Industry Household
SLP INT SLP INT SLP INT SLP INT
NO −7.30 18.24 - - −2.82 49.62 −10.57 82.44
DE −0.20 11.26 −0.26 21.46 −1.03 52.62 −2.72 73.38
GB −0.20 17.96 −0.27 23.08 −0.75 51.16 −2.41 76.72
Table 9.1.3: Slope and intersection point (e/GJ) of the inverse demand curves in
each market. (-) represents a nonexistent market.
In the BC we assume all producers to be profit maximizing Cournot players acting
strategically against other producers in the network. This assumption is based on
the fact that the European gas and electricity market are both partly liberalized
with possible presence of market power. The network operators are assumed to
be price takers assigning capacities on a willingness-to-pay basis of the strategic
producers. Thus, the 6 × 12 −matrix in Table 9.1.4 describing market power by
the producers in their respective markets, takes the following form:
The matrix is to be read as producer (f, i) (represented by the rows) has market
power in market n in node j (represented by the columns). The elements of the
matrix takes either the value 0 or 1 depending on the strategic influence of the
player. For the BC all feasible elements are set equal to 1, describing a Cournot
situation.
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NO DE GB
Producer HH IN HH IN HH IN
NG EL NG EL NG EL NG EL NG EL NG EL
NO (NG) 1 - 1 - 1 - 1 - 1 - 1 -
NO (EL) - 1 - 1 - 1 - 1 - - - -
DE (NG) 1 - 1 - 1 - 1 - 1 - 1 -
DE (EL) - 1 - 1 - 1 - 1 - - - -
GB (NG) - - - - 1 - 1 - 1 - 1 -
GB (EL) - - - - - - - - - 1 - 1
Table 9.1.4: Representation of market power in the BC of the model. A value of 1
represents Cournot behavior while 0 represents a price taker. In situations where
there are no arcs connecting a producer to a market or the producer of obvious
reasons cannot sell in the particular market, the cells are marked by (-).
9.2 Problem Instances
By altering several parameters we can analyze interesting sensitivity effects and
test the stability of our results. The analysis is divided into two main sections
where Section 9.2.1 tests different combinations of market power structures to
fit the current market situation in Northern Europe, while Section 9.2.2 gives a
sensitivity analysis of some important input parameters.
9.2.1 Market Power
One of the main features of the model is the possibility of analyzing the presence
of market power in the energy markets. By constructing different market scenarios
and comparing it with 2009 values, referred to as the Reference Case (RC), the
best fitted market model can be observed.
Using the strategic properties of the model, we can illustrate three main market
structures being PC, Cournot oligopoly and a monopoly. However, there might be
situations where only some of the players exert market power, while some of the
smaller players acts as a competitive fringe, having no impact in the final price.
In addition, we can construct scenarios where the market power parameter takes
values different from 0 or 1, lying somewhere in between.
By altering the market power parameter (MPfinj) for each producer-market com-
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bination we can obtain endless market scenarios. Testing for all combinations
would of course be impossible. Thus, it is reasonable to try out scenarios (Table
9.2.1) that seem plausible. In two of the scenarios we have chosen to set the market
power parameter equal to 0.5. The reason for this is the possibility of exerting
partial market power in a market, without acting as a true Cournot player, but
neither as a price-taker. Table 9.1.4 highlights the altered parameters that are
changed during runs to find the combination closest to today’s situation.
Scenario Description
Scenario 1 The German gas producer has no market power,neither in domestic nor foreign markets.
Scenario 2 All producers have market power domestically,but not in foreign markets.
Scenario 3 All producers have limited market power (MP = 0.5)both in domestic and foreign markets.
Scenario 4 All producers have limited market power (MP = 0.5)domestically, but act as price takers in foreign markets.
Table 9.2.1: Scenarios created by altering the market power parameter to fit the
situation of 2009 (RC).
9.2.2 Sensitivity Analysis
A sensitivity analysis is important to test the robustness of the results and to
examine how the model responds to a change in input parameters. The parameters
are altered one by one to observe the changes in output for each change.
As earlier mentioned (Section 7.3.1), two of the restrictions in the model serve a
different purpose than the rest, by linking players together rather than constraining
their activities. The sales restrictions of (7.3.4) are included to make sure that the
gas producers have access to the gas markets and electricity producers to the
electricity markets. Furthermore, the trade restrictions of (7.3.5) are included in
the model to ensure that only gas producers can sell to electricity producers and
that electricity producers can convert the gas into electricity. Hence, small changes
of SALESCAPfinj and TRADECAPfij will not affect the objective function.
For that reason, the restrictions that are interesting to investigate are those of
production capacity (7.3.3), conversion capacity (7.3.6) and arc capacity (7.3.29).
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Natural Gas Electricity
From To Transport Production Transport Production Convert.capacity capacity capacity capacity capacity
NO DE 37.21 134.95 2.65
∗∗
17.10 0.09GB 81.14 -
DE NO - 17.02 2.10
∗∗
74.20 25.39GB 36.52∗ -
GB NO - 94.35 - 45.34 44.84DE 13.39∗ -
*Includes transition through Netherlands and Belgium
**Includes transition through Denmark and Sweden
Table 9.2.2: Capacity limits (GW) that are altered to analyze sensitivity effects in
prices and volumes. (-) represents connections without existing arcs.
By varying those constraints, we can examine both domestic and foreign effects in
the output. Table 9.2.2 presents the parameters that are changed and examined.
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Results
This chapter presents results and considerations from the different problem in-
stances presented in Section 9. Section 10.1 presents results from the Base Case,
while results obtained from adjusting the strategic influence to fit the current mar-
ket situation are presented in Section 10.1.1. Section 10.2 treats the sensitivity
analysis of some of the most important input parameters.
10.1 Base Case
The following results are based on the data from the Base Case (BC) of Sec-
tion 9.1. Recall that the BC is based under the assumption that all producers
act as Cournot players and behaves strategically against other producers in an
oligopolistic market. The BC is compared to a perfectly competitive (PC) sce-
nario to analyze the different market characteristics and a Reference Case (RC) of
2009 (Eurostat [2010]) to see how it compares to actual data.
According to Figure 10.1.1 we can identify significantly lower prices in the PC
scenario compared to BC and RC. As each producer in the PC case will set price
equal to marginal cost it will generally face lower prices than a Cournot firm. The
exception being the gas markets in Germany where the prices in PC are higher
than in the RC. This can be explained due to the low capacity of gas production
in Germany. As a result, Norway is exporting at full capacity to Germany in both
PC and BC. If the model was extended with more exporting gas nodes, Germany
would have increased import of natural gas and the PC prices would decrease.
The fact that Germany imports substantial amounts of gas from both Russia and
Netherlands supports this argument (BP [2009]).
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Figure 10.1.1: Prices (e/GJ) (top) and consumption volumes (GW) (bottom) for
the Base Case (BC) in each of the markets compared to PC and 2009 values (RC).
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BC prices in Germany are on average higher than values of RC. As reasoned above
this is due to the fact that Germany in RC import large amounts of energy from
nodes outside the network. These volumes are not compensated for in the BC and
the results are increased prices.
Due to the inverse relationship between price and consumption, we can identify
the reverse pattern for consumption as for the prices. Because of low prices in the
PC case, the volumes of consumption are relatively high compared to RC. For the
same reasons the BC will on average (not in the gas markets of Germany) have
lower consumption because of higher prices, thus fitting the RC better than the
PC scenario.
Looking at consumption and prices for the different markets, we see that BC
matches the values from the RC fairly well. The fact that the prices and con-
sumption of the BC fits the RC better than the PC scenario indicates that market
power might be present as of 2009.
Figure 10.1.2 presents production, export and import for the three cases described
above. Interestingly, the PC scenario describes the traded volumes better than
the BC. This is due to the fact that the high consumption in PC forces the trade
to be higher between the countries than it normally would be. Thus, the high
volumes of trade will exceed the actual trade between the countries and level the
numbers of RC that include trade with countries outside our predefined network.
As a result, the PC scenario gives a unfounded good match with the export and
import numbers of RC. Even though the BC deviates substantially on export and
import numbers compared to the RC, the realism might be better preserved in the
BC scenario even so.
Looking at the welfare effects of the different scenarios we can identify big vari-
ations in consumer surplus (CS) and producer surplus (PS) comparing PC and
BC. Figure 10.1.3 illustrates this, showing that CS is larger in PC compared to
BC, while the opposite is the case for PS. Nevertheless, the social surplus (SS) is
larger in PC confirming that a perfectly competitive market produces the highest
allocative efficiency. Appendix A.2 discusses this and provides supporting theory
regarding welfare calculations. Another interesting observation is the welfare gains
to expect by liberalizing the market for both natural gas and electricity. Because
of the good match between BC and RC it is reasonable to assume similar results
comparing social welfare across the scenarios.
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10.1.1 Market Power
According to Section 9.2.1 we do not test for all combinations of market power but
limit ourselves to plausible scenarios, listed in Table 9.2.1. A graphical presentation
of the results for each scenario is given in Appendix C.
In Scenario 1 the German gas producer was assumed to be a price taker in all
markets, both regional and foreign. Because of Germany’s limited production of
natural gas the impact of reducing his market power is minimal, resulting in an
almost similar outcome as of the BC. Compared to the BC we get a slightly higher
consumption in the German gas market for households and a similar reduction of
consumption in the German gas market for industry.
The second scenario differs more from the RC than the BC. The Norwegian prices
remain nearly the same, but in the German and British gas markets we can observe
considerable changes. This could imply that only Norwegian producers possess
market power in their own node, while this is not true for the other countries.
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Figure 10.1.3: Welfare results (e) for BC compared to PC.
Giving all producers an MP-parameter of 0.5, as done in Scenario 3, suggests that
the producers are somewhere between price takers and price makers. The results
from this scenario deviates substantially from the RC. Compared with the BC, this
supports the hypothesis stating that producers in Northern Europe act as Cournot
players.
Furthermore, the fourth scenario has large discrepancies compared to RC, even
more than Scenario 3. Again, this gives reason to believe that the Northern Eu-
ropean gas and electricity market is not fully liberalized.
By comparing the four scenarios with the BC and RC, we conclude that the
Northern European energy market share a lot of characteristics with the Cournot
oligopoly. There are also some interesting remarks following from the analysis.
The results from Scenario 1 suggests that whether or not the German gas pro-
ducer possesses market power, he will not influence the prices and volumes notably.
Moreover, we observe that producers are price makers outside of their own nodes,
not price takers as the results from Scenario 2 indicates. Scenario 3 and 4 further
support the overall conclusion that the BC gives the best representation of how
the market power is distributed within Northern Europe.
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10.2 Sensitivity Analysis
To better understand the drivers of our results from the BC we carry out a sensitiv-
ity analysis of some important input parameters. By looking at the dual variables
it is possible to identify which of the restrictions that are binding at the optimal
solution of the BC and how a unit change of the capacities will affect the objective
function. As of Section 9.2.2 we found that the restrictions of production capac-
ity (7.3.3), conversion capacity (7.3.6) and arc capacity (7.3.29) are interesting
to investigate. By varying those constraints, both domestic and foreign effects
in the output can be examined. The following discussion is based on the results
illustrated in Appendix C.
Production Capacity (ρfi)
The German gas producer holds the highest value of the dual to the production
constraint (ρfi). According to Table 9.2.2, Germany has a relatively small produc-
tion capacity when it comes to gas, which is reflected by the value of the dual. If
the production capacity of the German gas producer increases, he sells more to the
German gas markets, thus lowering the prices and increasing consumer surplus in
Germany. That being the case, he would get a higher market share in the German
markets which again increases his own profit. This will reduce the profits of both
the Norwegian and British gas producers, but also reduce the Network Operator’s
profit seeing a reduction in the marginal willingness-to-pay, (tfeefij).
Conversion Capacity (τfi)
In BC, both duals of the Norwegian and British electricity producers’ constraints
are strictly positive. By increasing the conversion capacity of the Norwegian elec-
tricity producer, he will buy and convert more gas from the Norwegian gas pro-
ducer while simultaneously lowering his own production. Net production remains
the same, but the costs of production is reduced, thus increasing his profit. The
prices in the Norwegian market will remain the same.
A similar change of the British conversion capacity, results in a different reac-
tion. The Norwegian gas producer will increase his production and export to the
British electricity producer. He increases his sales to the domestic electricity mar-
ket causing a growth in consumer surplus while at the same time earning a bigger
profit.
Arc Capacity (ωfij)
An increase of the arc capacity between Great Britain and Germany will cause
the particular gas flow to increase, thus making the gas market in Germany more
competitive, again resulting in lower prices and increased consumer surplus in the
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German market. Allowing the British gas producer to sell more into the German
markets increases his profits, but at the same time reduces the market power
and profits of the German gas producer. The Norwegian gas producer responds
to this by increasing his sales to the British market, who in turn has become
more attractive, now that the British gas producer is exporting more of his own
production.
Concluding remarks
An increase in the production capacity can turn out to be favorable for both the
consumers and the investing producer. The producer is able to sell and possibly
earn more profits, but will also create lower prices, thus increasing consumer sur-
plus. However, the investment costs by expanding production capacity may exceed
increased future earnings on the investment. This is not confirmed by our results,
but could be investigated by a farsighted model.
Moreover, increased conversion capacities favors first and foremost the electricity
producers, causing lower production costs. Positive effects in consumer surplus
can also be observed, as seen in Figure C.0.8 and C.0.10.
Higher arc capacities makes it easier to access markets in foreign nodes. This en-
courages greater competition, in turn making the market more liberalized. From
Appendix A we know that this increases consumer surplus and decreases the to-
tal producer surplus, but the net effect of social surplus is positive. The results
displayed in Figure C.0.12 verifies these claims.
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Chapter 11
Discussion
This chapter provides an evaluation of the model stated in Chapter 7. A brief
discussion of the weaknesses and limitations of the model is given in Section 11.1,
followed by suggestions for further work and model improvements in Section 11.2.
11.1 Limitations
The model possess a lot of simplifications and assumptions made in order to reduce
complexity and allowing us to find a unique solution.
Assuming a myopic view simplifies the decision-making, but excludes possibilities
of expansion, investments and other decision strategies that may be more profitable
for the players in the long-run. Choosing a deterministic model rather than a
stochastic one eases the modeling process, but can cause the players to make
decisions they otherwise would not make because of uncertainty of the outcome.
Furthermore, the players are not allowed to play mixed strategies. This could
have added more realism to the model and would have been relatively easy to
implement. The rationale for not including it in the model is because of the
difficulties of solving it numerically.
Intentionally, we have chosen to ignore regional distribution within in each node.
The domestic distribution network is unquestionably important and will influence
the international flow of both gas and electricity. This shortcut can lead to some
inaccuracies in the results, but we are confident that the overall conclusion will
remain the same.
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The classification of the players and how they interact is simplified compared to
a real world situation. We have only included producers, responsible of producing
gas and electricity and sell to end-users or other producers (EL), and network
operators, responsible for transporting the commodities between the nodes. We
believe this representation of the market participants do not lower the quality of
the end results significantly, compared to a more detailed classification of the roles
and their interaction. In addition, we have only allowed for one producer of each
commodity in each node. This will not preserve regional accuracies, but the big
picture would not be affected to a large extent.
Pricing in the end-user market by inverse demand functions is a fair assumption
to make. Assuming that electricity producers buy gas at a price equal to a border
price of the importing node is realistic in the sense that it reflects their marginal
willingness-to-pay.
Moreover, we decided to only include Norway, Great Britain and Germany as
nodes in the model. Naturally, including more countries would have created a
better representation of the market interaction, but it could also have created
additional complexity. Given the same model structure, including a fourth node,
for instance, would force one of the nodes to act as a transit node as well as a
production node, causing challenges in expressing the arc capacity restrictions. In
that case, the links between two nodes are not exclusive between two countries.
This might change the model structure ending up with a GNE instead of an MCP.
GNE’s are generally harder to solve and can cause trouble showing uniqueness of
a solution.
The way the model is formulated, it does not capture the interaction between
the different markets sufficiently. By taking use of cross-price elasticities in the
pricing in each market this aspect could be dealt with. A consumer with the
flexibility of choosing between both gas and electricity will of course compare the
market prices for each commodity and select the one that offers him the greatest
utility. The rationale for not including this in the model is due to lack of quality
data concerning cross price elasticities. If such data were to appear, it would be
relatively easy to implement this in the model, thus increasing the accuracy of the
results.
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11.2 Further Work
The proposed model of this thesis can be further developed to bring new aspects
into the model.
A natural way of expanding the model would be to include more nodes to earn
a more realistic representation of the European energy market. Considering the
difficulties of adding a node without changing the overall class of the model, the
representation of trade should be reevaluated.
Including traders, LNG-storage operators and exporters would give the model a
more precise picture of the two markets (See Egging et al. [2010] for implementa-
tion). The same applies for allowing more than one player of each type in the three
nodes, e.g. letting more than one electricity producer operate in Norway. Both as-
sumptions would create a more realistic representation of the market interaction,
but would also be more demanding to model.
Besides, including more commodities, e.g. coal or/and oil, could be a next step
creating a broader perspective, capturing cross relations between the new markets.
Input data with quality is a necessity if this were to be implemented.
Incorporation of time dependency would be a natural extension, causing the players
to think farther ahead in contrast to the myopic view of this model. This would
allow for investment decisions that are not necessarily profitable in the short-
run, but can be profitable in a long-term perspective. Interesting implementations
could be possible investments in pipeline capacity, increased production capacity or
LNG-storing facilities. Thus, including a time perspective would give the model
a planning and forecasting dimension useful for creating future predictions and
estimates.
Given the deterministic assumption, the model produces the same results for every
set of input data. In a real world situation a lot of uncertainties are present,
bringing out a need for a stochastic model, with the ability of handling uncertainty.
This would require more computational power, but would be a big step towards a
more realistic representation of the energy market.
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Chapter 12
Conclusion
This thesis presents a strategic complementarity model focusing on analyzing prices
and volumes of the gas and electricity markets of Northern Europe. Using fun-
damentals of equilibrium programming, the model can examine strategic choices
made by different actors through a simplified value chain representation of the two
markets.
The game theoretic modeling approach allows for representation of market power
and thereby create different scenarios based on the strategic influence of each mar-
ket participant. The model is formulated as a Mixed Complementarity Problem
where each player solves his optimization problem within the complementarity
system, giving the simultaneous solution to all players in the game.
Despite the liberalization process the markets for gas and electricity have under-
gone, the results indicates that market power is present on the supply side of each
market. Comparing different market structures, our model results suggests that
a Cournot representation of the suppliers gives the best match of the current sit-
uation as of 2009. However, the welfare gains of further liberalization are large
comparing the Cournot representation with a perfectly competitive scenario.
The results indicates that increased capacities of production can turn out favorable
for both the consumers and the investing producer. The producer will increase
his sales and possibly earn higher profits, but will also create lower prices, thus
increasing the social welfare. However, the value of investments are not considered
in this thesis due to the underlying myopic assumption.
Bottlenecks in the network, where both grid and pipelines are on capacity, can
be identified. The sensitivity analysis intimates that an infrastructural expansion
will benefit both consumers and producers by increased profits and lower prices,
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suggesting that network investments are desirable from a social perspective.
The results of the model reflects simplified representations of the actual market
situation in Northern Europe. The model is based on a large set of assumptions
made in order to clarify the modeling and guarantee for solution. Further research
should move from a myopic analysis to a farsighted and time-dependent model
allowing for investments and possible stochastic implementation. In addition, an
extended nodal network would provide more realism into the model completing
the actual trade balances between the countries. However, the modeling results
prove significant potential of using the complementarity format to describe market
players’ behavior in a market setting.
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A.1. EXTERNAL DEMAND
The next sections presents theoretic material needed to understand the economics
of modeling energy markets. The theory is presented in short and is meant to be
demonstrative, rather than supplementary and therefore not cover all the aspects
of each subject. Section A.1 focuses on external demand, its characteristics and
how demand can be represented mathematically. Section A.2 provides basic theory
on various market structures and explains the underlying assumptions.
A.1 External Demand
There are many ways of interpreting external demand for products or services.
There are fixed-price scenarios where the consumers’ willingness to pay is the
same regardless of the quantity. This representation is not reflecting Average Joes
behavior, but can be descriptive for theoretical purposes. A more reputable way
of expressing demand is by a downward sloping inverse demand curves. In this
situation the willingness to pay decreases as the quantity increases. This property
is referred to as the law of demand1 and are valid for nearly all scenarios2.
A.1.1 The Inverse Demand Curve
Inverse demand curves are characterized by price on the vertical axis and quantity
on the horizontal axis. Depending on the complexity of the model the demand
curve can have numerous mathematical properties. (Figure A.1.1).
The linear inverse demand curve is commonly expressed the following way:
P (Q) = a+ b ·Q (A.1.1)
where P (Q) denotes the price of the good as a function of the quantity demanded
Q. The constant a represents the intersection with the vertical axis, i.e. the price
where the quantity demanded is zero and the slope b of the demand curve describes
how a change in price will affect the quantity demanded.
1The law of demand states that the amount demanded of a commodity and its price are
inversely related, given that the income of the consumer, prices of the related goods, and tastes
and preferences of the consumer remain unchanged.
2Exceptions are Veblen and Giffen goods.
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Figure A.1.1: Downward sloping linear inverse demand curve (left) and a quadratic
inverse demand curve (right).
A.1.2 Elasticities
Important aspects of an economical analysis are considerations on how a change
in one factor will affect another factor. Elasticities are measures of just that and
plays an important role in analyzing and comparing different market situations.
Price Elasticity of Demand
The slope b = ∆Q
∆P
multiplied with the base at a given quantity and price (P
Q
) forms
the price elasticity of demand denoted by ε:
ε =
(
∆Q
∆P
)
·
(
P
Q
)
(A.1.2)
This measure shows the responsiveness of the quantity demanded of a good or
service to a change in price. As opposed to the slope, the price elasticity of
demand (PED) is independent of the units used for P and Q, and therefore a
more comparable measure. Figure A.1.2 shows different elasticity levels with the
corresponding demand scenario. D1 forms a perfectly inelastic demand curve, a
situation where the customers simply has to buy the product regardless of its price
(e.g. narcotics). Moreover, D2 illustrates a perfectly elastic demand curve where
the customers face a large number of perfect substitutes of the product (e.g. nails,
spikes). While the two preceding examples shows extremities, D3 represents a more
realistic demand curve where PED increases when moving from left to right. In
the upper left corner we have a relatively elastic PED meaning that a percentage
change in quantity demanded is greater than that in price. At the middle point we
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have a demand that is unit elastic while the lower right region shows a relatively
inelastic demand were a percentage change in quantity is less than that in price.
P(Q) 
! = -! 
! = 0 
D1 
D2 
-! < ! < -1 
! = -1 
-1 < ! < 0 
D3 
Figure A.1.2: Price Elasticity of Demand for different inverse demand curves.
Estimation of Inverse Demand Curves
Estimating inverse demand curves can be done by applying the relationship be-
tween the price elasticity of demand and the inverse demand curves. Assuming a
reference point on the demand curve (QREF , pREF ) we have:
pREF = a+ b · QREF (A.1.3)
where pREF and QREF are constants.
Recall in the general case, the demand is expressed through the inverse demand
curve of (A.1.4).
p(Q) = a+ b · Q (A.1.4)
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Using the definition of the price elasticity of demand and the inverse demand
curves, the following relationships can be expressed:
Q = −a
b
+
1
b
· p, ε = ∂Q
∂p
· p
Q
=
1
b
· p
Q
(A.1.5)
b =
pREF
QREF
· 1
ε
, a = pREF − b ·QREF (A.1.6)
Inserting A.1.6 into A.1.4 gives the following estimation of the inverse demand
curve:
p = pREF − b ·QREF + p
REF
QREF
· 1
ε
·Q (A.1.7)
A.2 Market Structures
There are several ways individuals and companies can interact with each other,
named market structures. Generally there are four different structures, each rep-
resenting an abstract characterization of a type of real market. Whilst Perfect
Competition and Monopoly form the extremes, Oligopoly and Monopolistic Com-
petition are competitive scenarios that lie between somewhere in between.
A.2.1 Perfect Competition
In a market described by perfect competition there exist a large number of firms
producing a homogenous product, where all market influents are perfectly informed
and there are no barriers or entry fees for both seller and buyer. The firms demand
curve is perfectly elastic (ε = −∞) meaning that price is the same regardless of the
quantity. Each firm will maximize its profit by setting the price equal to marginal
cost. There are no long-term profits (or losses) to obtain, but in the short-run
firms may earn profits (or losses). Hence the firms are price takers and do not
excess market power.
Perfect competition has the desirable properties of forcing firms to sell at the lowest
possible price while producing at the lowest possible costs. It can be argued that
perfect competition is a desired social goal because it results in a social welfare
maximum. However, many economists criticize the passive interpretation of the
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agents and point out different actions as advertising, innovation and design that
characterize most industries. They substantiate the criticism with historical data
showing that many firms earn above-average long-run-profits even in industries
with many firms.
A.2.2 Monopolistic Competition
Monopolistic competition and perfect competition share many of the same char-
acteristics; there exists many firms of equal size, entry and exit barriers are not
present and the long-term profits are low. However, there are one important differ-
ence: the monopolistic competitor produces differentiated rather than homogenous
products. The different products are substitutes but because of branding and ad-
vertising the monopolistic competitor set his product apart from the competition.
Buyers are willing to pay more for a product or service because they believe it
is much better than their other choices. A successfully producer will therefore
experience a demand curve that becomes more vertical or inelastic.
Monopolistic competitive markets often experience price discrimination, a method
to increase economic profits by selling the same good or service at a number of dif-
ferent prices. The greater the price discrimination, the greater the profits because
buyers lose some of their consumer surplus. If price discrimination were carried
to its logical conclusion, we would have perfect price discrimination and buyers
would lose all of their consumer surplus.
The consumer surplus is the benefit to a consumer of buying a good at the equi-
librium price. It measures the difference between a buyer’s willingness to pay for
a good and the price the buyer actually pays. Equivalently the producer’s surplus
is the benefit to a producer of selling a good at the equilibrium price. In mathe-
matical terms the consumer and producer surplus takes the following form (under
the assumption of linear demand curves):
CS =
Pmax∫
Peq
Q(P )dP =
1
2
Qeq(Pmax − Peq) (A.2.1)
PS =
Peq∫
Pmin
Q(P )dP =
1
2
Qeq(Peq − Pmin) (A.2.2)
SS = CS + PS =
1
2
Qeq(Pmax − Pmin) (A.2.3)
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Figure A.2.1: Gains from trade represented by demand and supply curves.
A.2.3 Oligopoly
An oligopoly is a market structure in which there are a relatively small number of
firms competing in a market and where some barriers to entry exist. The essential
feature of competition in oligopoly markets is that firms recognize their mutual
interdependence. As a consequence, firms know that their decisions will affect
their rivals and vice versa. This is the essence of strategic thinking: competitors
must determine how rivals will respond to their actions. Classical oligopoly theory
was first addressed in the early 1800s and only recently, the analysis has been
augmented by game theory.
The first models to explicitly recognize the interdependence of decision making in
oligopoly situations were those of Cournot [1838], Bertrand [1883] and Von Stack-
elberg [1934]. In the Cournot model, two firms make simultaneous decisions about
how much of a homogeneous good to produce. In the Bertrand model, two firms
make simultaneous decisions about what price to set for the homogeneous good.
While in the Stackelberg model, one firm moves first, deciding how much to pro-
duce, and the other firm responds. A supplementary study of the Cournot model
and its characteristics is given in Section 5.3.
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A.2.4 Monopoly
You can have total control of the market situation, acting as monopolist in your
own market. By definition, a monopolist faces no rivals; hence a monopoly firm
is the industry and the monopolist’s demand curve is the industry demand curve.
There are only one seller, exist no substitutes and even in the long-run the mo-
nopolist controls all access to the market. A successful monopoly would face a
relatively inelastic demand curve. Hereby, a low coefficient of elasticity is indica-
tive of effective barriers to entry.
From a static perspective, monopoly is socially undesirable because output is re-
stricted. However, it is argued that monopolists are somewhat more inventive and
innovative, so that from a dynamic perspective the negative effects of monopoly are
reduced or even reversed. The Schumpeterian Hypothesis, first stated in Schum-
peter [1992], suggests that firms with market power are more likely to engage in
innovative activity or to invest in R&D.
Profit maximizing monopolists will produce output where marginal revenue (al-
ways less than price) equals marginal cost. This will typically result in less produc-
tion and a higher price compared to perfect competition. Whether a monopolist
earns profits depends on the position of its cost curves relative to demand.
95
Appendix B
GAMS Coding
96
B.1. GAMS CODE OF BASIC PRODUCTION MODEL
B.1 GAMS Code of Basic Production Model
1 Sets
3 n Nodes in the network
4 /a, b/
6 i Producers in the network
7 /g1, g2/
9 Alias(i,j)
10 Alias(n,m)
11 ;
13 Parameters
15 PRODCAP(i) Capacity limit of production of producer i
16 /p1 50,p2 50/
18 INT(n) Interception point of the inverse demand curve in node n
19 /a 50, b 50/
21 SLP(n) Slope of the inverse demand curve in node n
22 /a −1,b −1/
24 A(i) Linear cost factor in the cost function of producer i
25 /p1 1, p2 1/
27 B(i) Quadratic cost factor in the cost function of producer i
28 /p1 0.5, p2 0.5/
30 MP(i,n) Market power param. of producer i in node n
31 /p1.a 1,p1.b 1,p2.a 1,p2.b 1/
32 ;
34 Positive variables
36 q(i,n) Sold quantity of producer i to node n
38 lambda(i) Lagrange multiplier of prodconstraint of producer i
40 p(n) Price of natural gas in node n
42 z Profit function of producer i
43 ;
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47 Equations
49 profit Defines objective function
51 cap_constr(i) Capacity limit of production of producer i
53 price(n) Price in node n
55 stat_q(i,n) First order condition (FOC) of producer i
56 ;
58 profit.. z
59 =e=
60 sum(i,sum(n,p(n)∗q(i,n))
61 −(A(i)∗sum(m,q(i,m))
62 − B(i)∗sum(m,q(i,m))∗sum(m,q(i,m))))
63 ;
65 cap_constr(i).. CAP(i)
66 =g=
67 sum(n,q(i,n))
68 ;
70 stat_q(i,n).. −p(n)
71 − MP(i,n)∗SLP(n)∗q(i,n)
72 + A(i)
73 + 2∗B(i)∗q(i,n)
74 + lambda(i) =g= 0
75 ;
77 price(n).. p(n)
78 =e=
79 INT(n)
80 + SLP(n)∗sum(j,q(j,n))
81 ;
83 Model production
84 /stat_q.q, cap_constr.l,price.p/
85 ;
87 solve production using mcp
88 ;
90 display q.l, q.m,p.l
91 ;
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B.2 GAMS Code of MCP Model of the European
Energy Markets
1 Sets
3 n Markets in the network
4 /IG, HG, IE, HE/
6 i Nodes in the network
7 /NOR, GB, DE/
9 f Fuels in the network
10 /gas, el/
12 $ There are four markets in each of the three nodes of NOR, DE and GB
13 $ IG is Gas market for industry
14 $ HG is Gas market for households
15 $ IE is Electricity market for industry
16 $ HE is Electricity market for households
18 Alias(n,m)
19 Alias(i,j,l)
20 Alias(f,g)
21 ;
23 $ The following units are in GJ, GW and Euros
24 $ The values are changed during runs
26 Parameters
27 INT(m,i) Intersection point of IDC in market m in node i
28 /IG.NOR 18.24, HG.NOR 0, IE.NOR 49.62, HE.NOR 82.44,
29 IG.GB 11.26, HG.GB 21.46, IE.GB 52.62, HE.GB 73.38,
30 IG.DE 17.96, HG.DE 23.08, IE.DE 51.16, HE.DE 76.72/
32 SLP(m,i) Slope of IDC of market m in node i
33 /IG.NOR −7.3, HG.NOR 0, IE.NOR −2.819, HE.NOR −10.569,
34 IG.GB −0.2, HG.GB −0.259, IE.GB −1.032, HE.GB −2.718,
35 IG.DE −0.205, HG.DE −0.27, IE.DE −0.752, HE.DE −2.413
/
37 A(f,i) Linear cost factor in the of producer (f,i)
38 /gas.NOR 2.28, gas.GB 2.05, gas.DE 2.57,
39 el.NOR 8.25, el.GB 7.88, el.DE 7.99/
41 CONV Conversion factor in converting gas to electricity
42 /0.58/
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45 CONVCAP(f,i) Converting capacity of of producer (f,i)
46 /el.NOR 0.09
47 el.GB 44.8
48 el.DE 25.4/
51 PRODCAP(f,i) Capacity limit of production of producer (f,i)
52 /gas.NOR 135, gas.GB 94, gas.DE 17,
53 el.NOR 17, el.GB 45, el.DE 74/
55 TRADECAP(f,i,j) Capacity limit of trade from producer (f,i)
56 to node j
57 /gas.NOR.NOR inf
58 gas.NOR.GB inf
59 gas.NOR.DE inf
60 gas.GB.NOR inf
61 gas.GB.GB inf
62 gas.GB.DE inf
63 gas.DE.NOR inf
64 gas.DE.GB inf
65 gas.DE.DE inf/
67 Table
69 SALESCAP(f,i,n,j) Capacity limit of sales from producer (f,i)
70 to market n in node j
72 IG.NOR HG.NOR IE.NOR HE.NOR IG.GB HG.GB
IE.GB HE.GB IG.DE HG.DE IE.DE
HE.DE
73 gas.NOR inf inf 0 0 inf inf
0 0 inf inf 0 0
74 el.NOR 0 0 inf inf 0 0
inf inf 0 0 inf inf
75 gas.GB inf inf 0 0 inf inf
0 0 inf inf 0 0
76 el.GB 0 0 inf inf 0 0
inf inf 0 0 inf inf
77 gas.DE inf inf 0 0 inf inf
0 0 inf inf 0 0
78 el.DE 0 0 inf inf 0 0
inf inf 0 0 inf inf
79 ;
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87 Table
89 ARCCAP(f,i,j) Capacity limit of commodity f on arc (i,j)
90 NOR GB DE
91 gas.NOR inf 81.5 37.2
92 gas.GB 0 inf 13.4
93 gas.DE 0 36.5 inf
94 el.NOR inf 0 2.65
95 el.GB 0 inf 0
96 el.DE 2.1 0 inf
97 ;
99 Table
101 ARCCOST(f,i,j) Unit cost of transporting commodity f on arc (i,j)
102 NOR GB DE
103 gas.NOR 0 0.24 0.24
104 gas.GB 0 0 0.71
105 gas.DE 0 0.71 0
106 el.NOR 0 0 1.25
107 el.GB 0 0 0
108 el.DE 1.25 0 0
109 ;
111 Table
113 MP(f,i,n,j) Market power param. of producer (f,i)
114 in market n in node j
115 IG.NOR HG.NOR IE.NOR HE.nor IG.GB HG.GB
IE.GB HE.GB IG.DE HG.DE IE.DE
HE.DE
116 gas.NOR 1 1 1 1 1 1
1 1 1 1 1 1
117 el.NOR 1 1 1 1 1 1
1 1 1 1 1 1
118 gas.GB 1 1 1 1 1 1
1 1 1 1 1 1
119 el.GB 1 1 1 1 1 1
1 1 1 1 1 1
120 gas.DE 1 1 1 1 1 1
1 1 1 1 1 1
121 el.DE 1 1 1 1 1 1
1 1 1 1 1 1
122 ;
125 Variables
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127 bp(i) Border price of gas in node i
128 phi(f,i) Dual of of flow conservation constraint of
129 producer (f, i)
130 tfee(f,i,j) Dual of the floweq. of f on arc (i,j)
131 ;
133 Positive variables
135 q_sales(f,i,n,j) Sold quantity of producer (f, i)
136 to market n in node j
137 q_prod(f,i) Produced quantity of producer (f, i)
138 q_trade(f,i,j) Traded quantity from producer (f, i)
139 to node j
140 x_trade(f,i) Received trade of producer (f, i)
141 q_flow(f,i,j) Physical flow of commodity f on arc (i,j)
142 rho(f,i) Dual of production constraint
143 of producer (f, i)
144 kappa(f,i,j) Dual of trading constraint between
145 producer (f, i) and node j
146 omega(f,i,j) Dual of arclimit constraint of
147 commodity f on arc (i, j)
148 lambda(f,i,n,j) Dual of sales constraint
149 of producer (f, i)
150 tau(f,i) Dual of capacity converting constraint
151 of producer (f, i)
152 zPR(f,i) Profit function of producer (f, i)
153 zNO(f,i,j) Profit of the Network Operator fij
154 p(m,j) Price of energy of market n in node i
155 ;
157 Equations
159 profit(f,i) Defines objective function
160 of the producer (f, i)
161 prod_const(f,i) Production capacity constraint
162 price(n,i) Price in market n in node j
163 sellimit(f,i,n,j) Sales constraint between producer (f, i)
164 and market (n, j)
165 arclimit(f,i,j) Arc constraint of fuel f on arc (i,j)
166 tradelimit(f,i,j) Tradelimit between (f, i) and j
167 stat_qtrade(f,i,j) First order condition (FOC) of q_trade
168 stat_xtrade(f,i) First order condition (FOC) of x_trade
169 stat_sales(f,i,n,j) First order condition (FOC) of q_sales
170 stat_prod(f,i) First order condition (FOC) of q_prod
171 mb(f,i) flow out = flow in − mass balance
172 mc(i) Market clearing condition
173 FOC_NO(f,i,j) First order condition (FOC) of Network Op
174 floweq(f,i,j) Floweq of f on arc (i, j)
175 conv_constr(f,i) Converting capacity constraint
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176 NOProfit(f,i,j) Profit of the network operator
177 ;
179 profit(f,i).. zPR(f,i) =e=
180 sum(j,q_trade(f,i,j)∗bp(j))
181 + sum(n,sum(j,q_sales(f,i,n,j)∗(p(n,j)
182 − tfee(f,i,j))))
183 − x_trade(f,i)∗bp(i)
184 − sum(j,q_trade(f,i,j)∗tfee(f,i,j))
185 − A(f,i)∗q_prod(f,i)
186 ;
188 prod_const(f,i).. PRODCAP(f,i) − q_prod(f,i) =g= 0
189 ;
191 sellimit(f,i,n,j).. SALESCAP(f,i,n,j) − q_sales(f,i,n,j) =g= 0
192 ;
194 tradelimit(f,i,j).. TRADECAP(f,i,j) − q_trade(f,i,j) =g= 0
195 ;
197 conv_constr(f,i).. CONVCAP(f,i) − x_trade(f,i) =g= 0
198 ;
200 mb(f,i).. sum(n,sum(j,q_sales(f,i,n,j)))
201 + sum(j,q_trade(f,i,j))
202 − q_prod(f,i)
203 − CONV∗x_trade(f,i)
204 =e= 0
205 ;
207 stat_prod(f,i).. A(f,i)
208 + rho(f,i)
209 − phi(f,i)
210 =g= 0
211 ;
213 stat_sales(f,i,n,j).. − p(n,j)
214 − MP(f,i,n,j)∗SLP(n,j)∗q_sales(f,i,n,j)
215 + tfee(f,i,j)
216 + phi(f,i)
217 + lambda(f,i,n,j)
218 =g= 0
219 ;
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225 stat_qtrade(f,i,j).. − bp(j)
226 + tfee(f,i,j)
227 + phi(f,i)
228 + kappa(f,i,j)
229 =g= 0
230 ;
232 stat_xtrade(f,i).. bp(i)
233 − CONV∗phi(f,i)
234 + tau(f,i)
235 =g= 0
236 ;
239 price(m,i).. p(m,i)=e=
240 INT(m,i)
241 + SLP(m,i)∗sum(f,sum(j,q_sales(f,j,m,i)))
242 ;
244 mc(j).. sum(f,sum(i,q_trade(f,i,j)))
245 − sum(g,x_trade(g,j))
246 =e= 0
247 ;
249 NOProfit(f,i,j).. zNO(f,i,j)=e=
250 (tfee(f,i,j)
251 − ARCCOST(f,i,j))∗(q_trade(f,i,j)
252 + sum(n,q_sales(f,i,n,j)))
253 ;
255 arclimit(f,i,j).. ARCCAP(f,i,j)
256 − q_flow(f,i,j)
257 =g= 0
258 ;
260 FOC_NO(f,i,j).. −tfee(f,i,j)
261 + ARCCOST(f,i,j)
262 + omega(f,i,j)
263 =g= 0
264 ;
266 floweq(f,i,j).. q_flow(f,i,j)
267 − q_trade(f,i,j)
268 − sum(n,q_sales(f,i,n,j))
269 =e= 0
270 ;
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274 model stratmcp
275 /stat_qtrade.q_trade, stat_sales.q_sales,
276 stat_xtrade.x_trade, stat_prod.q_prod,
277 mc.bp, mb.phi, prod_const.rho,
278 tradelimit.kappa, sellimit.lambda,
279 arclimit.omega, price.p,
280 floweq.tfee,FOC_NO.q_flow,profit.zPR,
281 conv_constr.tau,NOprofit.zNO/;
283 solve stratmcp using mcp
284 ;
286 display
287 q_trade.l, q_trade.m, x_trade.l, x_trade.m,
288 q_sales.l,q_sales.m,q_prod.l,q_prod.m,
289 bp.l, mc.l, p.l,mb.l,tfee.l,zPR.l,lambda.l,phi.l,zno.l;
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Figure C.0.1: Prices (e/GJ) (top) and consumption volumes (GW) (bottom) for
Scenario 1 in each of the markets compared to 2009 values (RC).
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Figure C.0.2: Prices (e/GJ) (top) and consumption volumes (GW) (bottom) for
Scenario 2 in each of the markets compared to 2009 values (RC).
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Figure C.0.3: Prices (e/GJ) (top) and consumption volumes (GW) (bottom) for
Scenario 3 in each of the markets compared to 2009 values (RC).
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Figure C.0.4: Prices (e/GJ) (top) and consumption volumes (GW) (bottom) for
Scenario 4 in each of the markets compared to 2009 values (RC).
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Figure C.0.5: Prices (e/GJ) (top) and consumption volumes (GW) (bottom) for
increased production capacity in Germany.
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Figure C.0.6: Welfare results (e) for increased production capacity in Germany.
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Increased converting capacity in Norway Price Cournot Competition (BC) Price 
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Figure C.0.7: Prices (e/GJ) (top) and consumption volumes (GW) (bottom) for
increased conversion capacity in Norway.
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Figure C.0.8: Welfare results (e) for increased conversion capacity in Norway.
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Increased converting capacity in GB Price Cournot Competition (BC) Price 
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Figure C.0.9: Prices (e/GJ) (top) and consumption volumes (GW) (bottom) for
increased conversion capacity in Great Britain.
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Figure C.0.10: Welfare results (e) for increased conversion capacity in Great
Britain.
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Figure C.0.11: Prices (e/GJ) (top) and consumption volumes (GW) (bottom) for
increased arc capacity between Great Britain and Germany.
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Figure C.0.12: Welfare results (e) for increased arc capacity between Great Britain
and Germany.
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